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L JURIDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(j). 
the Supreme Court had original jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) 
and transferred the matter to this Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-4. 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented for review in this case are: , 
A. Whether the district court erred in holding that the Railroad Defendants had 
no duty to upgrade the warning devices or take other measures to protect the public 
commensurate with the risks at an ultra-hazardous crossing. (R. at 1270-75; 1278-80.) 
Standard of Review: Correctness. Summary judgment is a question of law, and the 
district court's resolution of the issue is afforded no deference. Tallman v. City of 
Hurricanes. 985 P.2d 892. 893 (Utah 1999V Moreover, the issues of whether a defendant 
owes a duty of care to a plaintiff is a question of law. Slisze v. Stanley-Bostitch. 979 
P.2d 317. 320 (Utah 1999). 
B. Whether the district court erred in concluding that the Railroad Defendants 
had no duty to reduce the train speed over an ultra-hazardous crossing. (R. at 1267-70.) 
Standard of Review: Correctness. Summary judgment is a question of law, 
and the district court's resolution of the issue is afforded no deference. Tallman. 985 
P.2dat 893. Moreover, the issue of whether a defendant owes a duty of care to a 
plaintiff is a question of law. Slisze. 979 P.2d at 320. 
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C. Whether the district court erred in holding that Amtrak did not have a duty 
to apply its brakes before reaching an ultra-hazardous crossing, even when the train crew 
knew that vehicles were crossing in front of the train. (R. at 1276-78.) 
Standard of Review: Correctness. Summary judgment is a question of law, 
and the district court's resolution of the issue is afforded no deference. Tallman. 985 
P.2d at 893. Moreover, the issue of whether a defendant owes a duty of care to a 
plaintiff is a question of law. Slisze. 979 P.2d 317. 320 (Utah 1999). 
D. Whether the district court erred in ruling that Amtrak had no duty to give 
audible warning of the train's approach to an ultra-hazardous crossing, even when the 
train crew knew that vehicles would likely cross in front of the train. (R. at 1275-76.) 
Standard of Review: Correctness. Summary judgment is a question of law, 
and the district court's resolution of the issue is afforded no deference. Tallman. 985 
P.2d at 893. Moreover, the issue of whether a defendant owes a duty of care to a 
plaintiff is a question of law. Slisze. 979 P.2d at 320. 
E. Whether the district court erred in ruling that the City of South Jordan had 
no duty to upgrade the warning devices or provide additional protection at an ultra-
hazardous crossing, which UDOT had designated for upgrade, and whether the district 
court erred in funding that City satisfied its duty of care. (R. at 1280-83.) 
Standard of Review: Correctness. Summary judgment is a question of law, 
and the district court's resolution of the issue is afforded no deference. Tallman. 985 
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P.2d at 893. Moreover, the issue of whether a defendant owes a duty of care to a 
plaintiff is a question of law. Slisze. 979 P.2d at 320. 
F. Whether the district court erred in striking the affidavits of Archie 
Burnham, Jr. P.E., Randy S. Hunter, Orlando Jerez, J. Clark Clenenden, and Paul F. 
Byrnes. (R. at 1263-65.) 
Standard of Review: Correctness. Whether the affidavits complied with the 
requirement of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) is a question of law. GNS 
Partnership v. Fullmer. 873 P.2d 1157. 1164 (Utah App. 1994); see Hall v. Fairmont 
Homes. Inc.. 664 N.E.2d 546. 552 (Ohio App. 1995) f de novo" review). 
I l l CONSTITUTIONAL/STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
This Court may be required to interpret the following statutory sections: 
A. Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-15.1. which provides: "The Department of 
Transportation so as to promote the public safety shall as prescribed in the act provide 
for the installing, maintaining, reconstructing, and improving of automatic and other 
safety appliances, signals or devices at grade crossings on public highways or roads over 
the tracks of any railroad or street railroad corporation in the state;" 
B. Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-15(2). which provides in part: "The department 
shall have the power to determine and prescribe the manner... and the terms of 
installation, operation, maintenance, use and protection of each crossing . . . of a public 
road or highway by a railroad ...;" and 
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C. Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-11. which provides: "Every railroad company 
shall be liable for damages caused by its neglect to make and maintain good and 
sufficient crossings at points where any line of travel crosses its road." 
IV. STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This wrongful death action arises from a collision between a high speed train and 
a motor vehicle that occurred on the night of December 31,1995 at a railroad crossing 
located at 102nd South in the City of South Jordan (the "Crossing"). The vehicle was 
driven by Brent Larrabee, age 18 (the "Larrabee vehicle"). Brent had two passengers: 
Jamie Swensen, age 19, and Aaron Price, age 18. Brent, Jamie and Aaron (sometimes 
referred to as the "Decedents") were all killed in the collision. The Crossing was 
equipped only with passive warning devices, the lowest level of crossing protection. 
These devices consisted of old and faded pavement markings, a partially obscured 
crossbuck sign, and a stop sign. 
The Larrabee vehicle was the second in a group of three vehicles. The driver of 
the first vehicle stopped at the stop sign at the Crossing, looked both ways, and 
proceeded onto the Crossing. The driver did not become aware that a train was 
approaching until she was on the Crossing directly in front of it. Brent Larrabee then 
came to the stop sign and brought his vehicle to a full stop. He was unaware of the 
approaching train, and proceeded over the crossing. When his vehicle was in the middle 
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of the Crossing, a northbound Amtrak train traveling at approximately 70 mph struck the 
vehicle, propelling it several hundred feet into a utility pole. Brent, Jamie, and Aaron 
were all fatally injured and died at the scene. 
The train crew saw the three vehicles approaching the Crossing. The crew 
testified that they were afraid the vehicles would not stop at the Crossing and were aware 
that the vehicles might be hit. Nevertheless, the locomotive engineer did not sound the 
emergency whistle signal nor did he slow or brake the train until the point of collision. 
The parents of Brent, Jamie, and Aaron (the "Parents") brought this wrongful 
death action against the City of South Jordan ("the City"), which is the roadway 
authority, Southern Pacific Transportation Co. ("Southern Pacific"), which is the owner 
and operator of the line, and the National Railroad Passenger Corporation ("Amtrak"), 
which is the owner and operator of the train (together the "Defendants"). (R. at 1-10.) 
(Southern Pacific and Amtrak are collectively referred to as the "Railroad Defendants.") 
The Parents alleged that the existing warning devices were inadequate and that the 
Crossing was ultra-hazardous and, as such, required additional protection that 
Defendants failed to provide. The Parents also claimed that the crew was negligent in 
their operation of the train and failed to give adequate warning of the train's approach. 
B. Course of Proceedings Below, 
On May 15, 1997, the Parents commenced this action in the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah against Defendants for their negligent acts and 
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omissions leading to the wrongful death of their children. (R. at 1-10.) On November 
16,1998, the City moved for summary judgment (R. at 151-87) and on November 17, 
1998, the Railroad Defendants jointly moved for summary judgement. (R. at 214-541.) 
All of the Defendants also moved to strike portions of the Parents' affidavits. (R. 1103-
18 & 1161-98.) The district court, judge Anne M. Stirba presiding, heard oral arguments 
on the motions on February 25, 1999. (R. at 1368-411). The district court re-opened the 
record to consider Plaintiffs Supplement to Oral Argument in Opposition the City's 
motion for summary judgment and the response thereto. (R. at 1234-37 & 1241-46.) 
C. Disposition in the District Court, 
On May 4, 1999, the district court entered its Memorandum Decision granting 
Defendants' motions for summary judgment and striking affidavits ("the Order"). (R. at 
1258-85.) The district court entered a judgment of dismissal of the City on June 2, 1999 
(R. at 1310-15) and a judgment of dismissal of the Railroad Defendants on June 4, 1999 
(R. at 1323-25). The Parents timely filed their Notice of Appeal on June 15, 1999. 
V, STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A, The Collision, 
1. On the night of December 31,1995, Brent Larrabee, Jamie 
Swensen, and Aaron Price met with some of their friends for the new year's holiday. 
The three friends were driving in a group of three vehicles. Brent Larrabee was driving 
the middle car of the group of three. (R. at 1261.) 
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2. Brent Larrabee drove west on 106th South, crossing the railroad 
tracks at that location. The railroad grade crossing at 106th South is protected with 
flashing lights and gates. (A diagram of the Crossing is located at R. 887.) 
3. These gates and lights were not activated when the Larrabee vehicle 
crossed over the 106th South crossing. In fact, these devices did not activate until after 
the third vehicle, which lagged behind the other two, had crossed the 106th South 
crossing. (R. at 928, Knapp Depo., at pp. 19-20.) 
4. The three vehicles drove north on 3rd West to the Crossing at 102nd 
South where the roadway jogs to the east to the Crossing. (R. 887.) 
5. Jacque Zimmerman, the driver of the first vehicle, stopped at the 
stop sign at the Crossing and looked both ways. Not seeing a train, she proceeded across 
the Crossing. (R. at 933, Zimmerman Depo., at pp. 37-38.) Jacob Wattleworth, a 
passenger in Jacque's car, looked both ways when Jacque stopped at the stop sign and 
also did not see the train. (R. at 916, Wattleworth Depo., at pp. 18, 20-24.) It was not 
until Jacque had driven onto the tracks that she and her passengers first saw the train. 
(Id.; R. at 933, Zimmerman Depo., at 37-38.) 
6. Brent Larrabee, the driver of the second vehicle, then came up to the 
stop sign at the Crossing and stopped. (R. at 925, Thornley Dep. at p. 61.) Brent 
remained stopped for approximately three seconds-sufficient time to look and see any 
noticeable train. (Id.) Apparently not seeing the approaching train, he began across the 
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tracks. (Id.) Whenhis vehicle reached the middle of the Crossing, a northbound Amtrak 
train traveling at approximately 70 mph struck the Larrabee vehicle propelling it several 
hundred feet into a utility pole. Brent, Jamie, and Aaron were fatally injured and died at 
the scene. (R. at 1260.) 
B. The Train Crew's Actions, 
7. The train crew operated the train at approximately 70 miles per 
hour. (R. at 1269.) 
8. The train crew saw the three vehicles approaching well in advance 
of the Crossing and knew they might not be aware of the approaching train and might 
cross in front of it. (R. at 1006, Thornley Dep. at pp. 53, 56.) David Maxfield, one of 
the train crew, testified that at least 1500 feet before the train reached the Crossing he 
became concerned that the cars might cross in front of the train and be hit. (R. at 1012, 
Maxfield Depo., at pp. 61-62.) 
9. Despite this concern, the train crew did not slow or brake the train 
until impact. (R. at 1016, Thornley Depo. at p. 67.) 
10. Also despite this concern, the train crew did not sound the 
emergency whistle signal before reaching the Crossing. (Id. at p. 68.) 
C. The Ultra-Hazardous Condition at the Crossing, 
11. The district court assumed in its Order that the Crossing was 
ultra-hazardous and needed additional warning devices. (R. at 1267, 1274.) 
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12. There is ample evidence that the Crossing is in fact ultra-hazardous: 
a. The Crossing is used by a high volume of high-speed trains. 
(R. at 912, 913.) 
b. The configuration of the crossing is such that a driver's 
visibility of northbound trains is highly restricted. (R. at 887.) At the Crossing, the 
railroad track is begins to curve westerly and the roadway intersects the track in the 
middle ofan"S" turn. (Id.) Accordingly, northbound trains overtake northbound 
vehicles from behind and at an awkward angle. (Id.) Because of this configuration, a 
driver's visibility of an oncoming train becomes "deceptive and difficult," making the 
Crossing "excessively] hazardous]." (R. at 889-92, Burnham Aff.) In fact, both the 
Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT") and the City have recognized that the 
crossing has "a very bad crossing angle and poor sight distances." (R. at 896.) The 
visibility problems are compounded because the track is elevated. 
€• The stop sign and crossbuck were not fully visible until a 
vehicle was at the intersection, the advance warning sign was not properly reflectorized, 
and the stop ahead sign was improperly located and inadequately reflectorized. (R. at 
891, Burnham Aff) 
13. The Crossing's ultra-hazardous nature is demonstrated by the 
accident history at the site. In 1938, a train collided with a school bus at the Crossing, 
killing 20 children and the school bus driver. From 1980 through 1995, there were seven 
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separate incidents in which trains hit cars. (R. at 889-92, Burnham AfF. ^  13.) In fact, 
UDOT had predicted a "high . . . accident rate" at the Crossing in the future. (R. at 913.) 
D. The Defendants9 Failure to Upgrade the Crossing's Warning Devices. 
14. Despite the ultra-hazardous nature of the Crossing, the public is 
protected only by "passive" warning devices, consisting of an advance warning sign, 
pavement markings, crossbuck signs, and a stopsign. (R. at 1261.) Passive warning is 
the lowest of form of warning, which can be upgraded to "active "warning devices (such 
as lights and gates) or grade separation (such as an overpass or underpass.) (Id.) 
15. The passive warning devices in place were worn, not legible, not 
fully reflectorized, and improperly positioned so as to be obscured until a vehicle is at the 
intersection. (R. at 889, 891, Burnham Aff) 
16. UDOT, the City and the Railroad Defendants have all recognized 
since at least 1979 that the passive protection at the Crossing is inadequate. However, 
Defendants have failed to upgrade the protection, including failing to install gates and 
lights, failure to impose a slow order on trains, failure to close the Crossing, failure to 
alter the design of the Crossing, and failure to take other similar protective measures. 
17. The following is the chronology of events leading to the collision: 
a. July 1979 - UDOT recommends to the City that automatic 
flashing lights and gates be installed at the Crossing, indicating that such improvements 
would be "safer by far" than the passive warning devices. (R. at 949-51.) 
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b. August 1979 - The City agrees to UDOT's recommendation. 
(R. at 953, 955.) 
c. May 1984 - The City fails to install additional warning 
devices and UDOT reiterates to the City the need for lights and gates. (R. at 957.) 
d. June 1984. UDOT completes a Design Study Report (the 
"1984 Report") stating that the existing stop signs, crossbucks, and advance warning 
signs were "inadequate." (R. at 912-13.) The 1984 Report also predicts a "high . . . 
accident rate" and notes the high volume of high-speed trains that use the Crossing. (Id) 
e. August 1984 - UDOT again notifies the City that automatic 
lights and gates are needed at the Crossing and attaches the 1984 Report. (R. at 959-62.) 
f. March 1985 - UDOT asks the City to enter into a cooperative 
agreement for construction of the safety improvements at the Crossing. (R. at 964-76.) 
g. December 1985 - UDOT again notifies the City that flashing 
lights and gates have been approved for the Crossing. It also states that closure of the 
Crossing is another alternative. (R. at 978-79.) 
hv July 1987 - UDOT asks the City to move forward with safety 
improvements at the Crossing. (R. at 981.) 
i. September 1989 - UDOT completes an Environmental Study 
for upgrading the Crossing (the "1989 Study"). (R. at 908-10). The 1989 Study 
recognizes that the Crossing is "substandard" and proposes the installation of flashing 
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light signals and gates. (Id. at 909.) The 1989 Study concludes: "There are only two 
alternatives. Do the rehabilitation or do nothing. The do nothing alternative is 
unacceptable because existing protection is inadequate." (IdL) 
j . May 1990- UDOT notifies the City that if the Crossing 
remains open it must have flashing lights and gates installed. (R. at 983-85.) 
k. June 1992 - The City agrees to place additional passive 
warning devices at the Crossing. (R. at 896-98, Surveillance Review.) 
1. July 1992 - The City acknowledges the Crossing is 
"dangerous" and expresses its desire to close the Crossing. The City admits that the 
closure of the Crossing may take up to five years. The City again acknowledges the need 
at least for additional warning signs to temporarily help the situation. (R. at 987-88.) 
m. October 1992 - UDOT notifies the City that the additional 
warning signs have not been installed and pleads with the City to do so. (R. at 990.) 
n. July 1979-December 1995 - Despite the City acknowledging 
that the Crossing is dangerous and agreeing to install lights and gates, and despite 
UDOT's efforts to persuade the City to do so, no improvements to the passive devices 
were ever made and no lights or gates were installed. 
o. December 1995 - Jamie Swensen, Aaron Price and Brent 
Larrabee are killed at the Crossing. (R. at 1260.) 
SaltI.ake-114345 1 0027625-00001 12 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18. The City knew that federal funds were available for 90% of the cost 
of upgrading the Crossing and that it only had to pay 10%. In 1979 the cost to the City 
would have been only $6,000 to $7,200. (R. at 949-51, 953, 955.) In 1984 it would 
have been only $9,000. (R. at 964-76.) And, in 1990 it would have been only $13,000. 
(R. at 983-85.) In 1996, only weeks after the tragic collision, the City paid 
approximately $25,000 to improve the passive warning devices at the Crossing. (R. at 
992-96; Milheim Dep. at pp. 31-34.) Automatic warning devices, flashing lights, and 
gates have still not been installed at the Crossing. 
19. The Railroad Defendants could have upgraded the Crossing with 
flashing lights and gates at any time before the Collision at their own volition. (R. at 
998, 999, Hunter Aff.; R. at 1002, 1004, Jerez Aff.) 
E. Disputed Material Facts, 
The Court granted summary judgment for Defendants even though there are many 
issues of material fact that are disputed: . •. • ,
 ? u; 
20. The district court found that at the time of the Collision a stop sign, 
crossbuck sign, and an advance warning sign were in place. (R. at 1260.) This fact is not 
disputed. However, the district court's finding that these devices were "visible the night 
of the Collision" is disputed. (R. at 1277.) The pavement markings were old, worn and 
faded at the time of the collision and were difficult to see. The advance warning sign 
was not fully reflectorized. The stop sign was confusing to approaching motorists. 
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Moreover, the stop sign was placed in front of the crossbuck signs partially obscuring the 
driver's view of the railroad crossbuck. The crossing warning signs also were not 
appropriate to warn traffic approaching this railroad crossing and did not meet the 
standards of the Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD). (R. at 889-92. 
Burnham Aff.; R. at 894, photograph of roadway.)
 h-
21. Whether the passive warning devices at the Crossing were adequate 
and effective is also disputed: > 
a. The warning signs were not adequately visible. (R. at 889-
92. Burnham Aff.) UDOT recognized the inadequacy of the passive warning signs 
throughout its correspondence with the City, in the 1984 Report ("existing protection [is] 
inadequate"), and in the 1989 Study (installing lights and gates necessary because 
"existing protection is inadequate"). (See ^ f 17.a-.m above.) 
b. The City recognized the inadequacy of the passive warning 
signs by acknowledging that the crossing was dangerous and by pledging to place 
additional passive devices until the Crossing was closed. (R. at 987-88; R. at 896-98.) 
c. The passive warnings were inadequate because the Crossing 
is ultra-hazardous. The Crossing's configuration has a "very bad crossing angle." (R. at 
896.) This configuration provided "poor sight distances" (id.) and made a driver's 
visibility of an oncoming train "deceptive and difficult." (R. at 889-92, Burnham Aff.) 
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d. The inadequacy and ineffectiveness of the existing warning 
devices is evidenced by the witnesses. Despite having stopped and looked, the first 
vehicle's occupants were unaware of the train until they had pulled onto the Crossing. 
(R. at 933, Zimmerman Depo., at pp. 37-38; R. at 916, Wattleworth Dep. at pp. 18-24.) 
e. Brent Larrabee's actions also evidence the ineffectiveness of 
the passive warning devices. Brent stopped at the Crossing for approximately three 
seconds, long enough to look both ways, before proceeding across the tracks. (R. at 925-
26; Thornley Depo. at p. 61.) When Brent pulled forward, the train was only moments 
from the Crossing. (Id) The only reasonable inference from Brent's actions is that he 
could not see the train. 
22. The district court's finding that the Train was capable of being seen, 
and its corollary finding that the raised track increased the train's visibility, are disputed. 
(R. at 1275; 1282; 262, 1277.) Contrary to the district court's findings, the Crossing's 
configuration has a "very bad crossing angle." (R. at 896.) This configuration provided 
"poor sight distances" (id) and made a driver's visibility of oncoming trains "deceptive 
and difficult." (R. at 889-92, Burnham Aff.) Moreover, the occupants of the first car 
testified that they could not see the train until they were on the track. (See ^  5 above.) 
Brent Larrabee's own actions (i.e., pulling onto the track directly in front of the train) 
also evidence that the train was not reasonably capable of being seen. (See^j 6 above.) 
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23. The Court's finding that the first car came to a "rolling stop" is 
disputed. (R. at 1262.) In fact, it is undisputed that the driver of the first car came to a 
complete stop. (See If 5 above; R. at 787, Hackett Depo., at p. 22, 24.) 
24. Whether the train crew gave an audible warning between 106th 
South crossing and the subject Crossing is disputed. (See R. at 1262, R. at 1277.) The 
occupants of the vehicles did not hear the train horn until the instant before the collision. 
(R. at 937, Wattleworth Depo. at p. 36; R. at 940, Sant Depo. at pp. 59-62.) 
25. The district court's finding that the engineer knew of should have 
know that Brent Larrabee might cross in front of the train "only when [he] started across 
the track" is disputed. In fact, it is undisputed that the train crew saw the three vehicles 
approaching in a caravan well in advance of the Crossing and knew they might not be 
aware of the approaching train or might try to beat the train across the Crossing. (R. at 
1006, Thornley Dep. at p. 53, 56.) David Maxfield, one of the crew, testified that at least 
1500 feet before the train reached the Crossing he became concerned that the cars were 
going to pull in front of the train and be hit. (R. at 1012, Maxfield Dep., at p. 61-62.) 
26. The district court's finding that the Defendant Railroads did not 
allow a dangerous condition on the track is disputed. (R. at 1274-75; 1279.) The 
dangerous Crossing configuration accompanied by inadequate warning devices are the 
dangerous condition. (See.fflf 11-17 above.) 
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VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1, The district court erred in holding that the Railroad Defendants did not 
have a duty to upgrade the warning devices or take other measures to protect the public 
commensurate with the risks posed at the Crossing. The Court correctly assumed, and 
there is ample evidence to show, that the Crossing was "more than ordinarily hazardous." 
At ultra-hazardous crossings, Utah law imposes upon railroads a duty to take measures to 
reduce the risks at the crossing commensurate with the danger posed to the public. 
Walker v. Union Pacific R. Co.. 844 P.2d 335, 340-42 (Utah App. 1993). Because the 
district court erred in finding that Amtrak owed no such duty, this Court should reverse 
the order granting summary judgement. The issue of whether the Railroad Defendants 
breached this duty by failing to take "commensurate measures" to reduce the risks posed 
by the Crossing is a question of fact for a jury. 
2. The district court erred in holding that the Railroad Defendants did not 
have a duty to reduce the train speed over the Crossing. At ultra-hazardous crossings, 
Utah law imposes upon railroads a duty to take measures to reduce the risks at the 
crossing commensurate with the danger posed to the public. Walker. 844 P.2d at 340-42. 
One of the possible measures a railroad may take to satisfy this duty is to reduce its train 
speed through a "slow order." Because the district court erred in finding that Amtrak 
owed no such duty, this Court should reverse the order granting summary judgement. 
Whether the Railroad Defendants breached this duty by failing to issue a "slow order" is 
a question of fact for the jury. 
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The Parents' claim that the Railroad Defendants negligently failed to lower the 
train speed over the Crossing is not preempted by federal law. 49U.S.C. § 20106 
provides that a state law regarding train safety is not preempted if it is necessary to 
eliminate or reduce an "essentially local safety hazard." The ultra-hazardous conditions 
at the Crossing and the inadequate protection from those conditions render the Crossing a 
"local safety hazard." 
3. The district court erred in holding that Amtrak crew did not have a duty to 
apply the train's brakes before reaching the Crossing. Under Utah law, the train crew 
had the duty to apply the train's brakes when it knew or should have know that the 
Larrabee vehicle might cross in front of it. Lawrence v. Bamberger R.R., 282 P.2d 335. 
338 (Utah 1955.) Moreover, because the Crossing was ultra-hazardous, the train crew 
could not assume that Brent Larrabee would be able to take reasonable precautions to 
avoid a collision. There is a disputed issue of material fact as to when the train crew 
knew or should have known that Brent Larrabee would cross in front of the train. 
Because the district court erred in finding that Amtrak owed no duty to brake and 
ignored the disputed issues of material fact, this Court should reverse the order granting 
summary judgement. , 
4. The district court erred in holding that Amtrak did not have a duty to 
provide adequate audible warning of the train's approach. Utah law provides that a train 
crew has a duty to use all reasonable efforts to warn someone that it knew or should have 
know was in danger. Lawrence. 282 P.2d at 338. Utah law also imposes a duty upon 
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railroads to take measures to reduce the risks at an ultra-hazardous crossing 
commensurate with those risks. Walker, 844 P.2d at 340-42. Whether Amtrak breached 
these duties by failing to give adequate audible warning is a question of fact. Because 
the district court erred in finding that Amtrak owed no duty and ignored the disputed 
issues of material fact, this Court should reverse the order granting summary judgement. 
The Parents' claim that Amtrak breached its duty of care by failing to give 
adequate audible warning is not preempted by federal law. 49U.S.C. $ 20106 provides 
that a state law regarding train safety is not preempted if it is necessary to eliminate or 
reduce an "essentially local safety hazard." The ultra-hazardous conditions at the 
Crossing and the inadequate protection from those conditions render the Crossing a 
"local safety hazard." 
5. The district court erred in holding that the City of South Jordan had no 
duty to upgrade the warning devices or provide additional protection at the Crossing. 
Under Utah law, municipalities have a duty to maintain streets reasonably safe for travel, 
including the duty to provide "reasonably sufficient" warnings to warn the public of 
dangerous conditions on the street. Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light 969 P.2d 403, 
406 (Utah 1998). Whether the City breached this duty by failing to provide "reasonably 
sufficient" warning is a question of fact. The district court also erred by ignoring ample 
evidence that the devices at the Crossing were not "reasonably sufficient." Because the 
district court misapplied the City's duty and because there are disputed issues of material 
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fact as to whether the City breached this duty, this Court should reverse the order 
granting summary judgement. 
6. The district court erred in striking the affidavits of Archie Burnham, Jr., 
Randy S. Hunter, Orlando Jerez, J. Clark Clenenden, and Paul F. Byrnes from its 
consideration of the motions for summary judgment. The expert affidavits submitted in 
opposition to the motions for summary judgment complied with both Rule 56(e) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Vn. ARGUMENT 
The district court's order granting Defendants' motions for summary judgment 
should be reversed for erroneously defining the duties of care owed by Defendants to the 
Decedents and ignoring evidence creating disputed issues of material fact. The Court 
began its analysis properly by assuming that the Crossing was "more than ordinarily 
hazardous" (or in other words, "ultra-hazardous"). Despite this assumption, however, 
the district court held that Defendants had no duty to make this ultra-hazardous Crossing 
safe for the public. According to the district court, Defendants had no duty to provide 
effective warning devices or take other protective measures, no duty to run the train at a 
slower speed, no duty to sound the horn, and no duty to break. Essentially, the district 
court's decision immunizes railroads and municipalities from exercising any level of care 
at railroad crossings. In doing so, however, the district court ignored well-established 
Utah case law setting forth the duty of railroads to warn and protect the public at ultra-
hazardous crossing and the duty of municipalities to provide reasonably sufficient 
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warning of dangerous conditions on public streets. The district court's order also ignores 
good public policy. If allowed to stand, railroads will be permitted to run trains at high 
speeds over ultra-hazardous crossings without the railroads or the municipalities-those in 
the best position to evaluate and mitigate hazards-having any responsibility to protect or 
warn would-be travelers. Similarly, municipalities will be permitted to ignore the 
directives of UDOT and renege on commitments to upgrade crossing protection. 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the district court's order granting defendants 
summary judgment. 
A. The District Court Erred in Holding that the Railroad Defendants Had 
No Duty To Provide Adequate Warning Devices or Take Other 
"Commensurate Measures" to Protect the Public at the Crossing. 
The Parents have alleged that the Crossing is ultra-hazardous and, as such, the 
Railroad Defendants should have taken measures to protect the public commensurate 
with the dangers at the Crossing. (R. at 4, 5.) The district court, however, held as a 
matter of law that under Utah Code Ann. $ 54-4-15.1 the Railroad Defendants had no 
duty to upgrade the warning devices or take other measures despite the ultra-hazardous 
nature of the Crossing. (R. at 1270-75.) 
The district court erred. Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-15.1 provides: "The Department 
of Transportation so as to promote the public safety shall as prescribed in the act provide 
for the installing, maintaining, reconstructing, and improving of automatic and other 
safety appliances, signals or devices at grade crossings on public highways or roads over 
the tracks of any railroad or street railroad corporation in the state." Although this statute 
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may vest UDOT with the authority for governing the installation of automatic warning 
devices at railroad grade crossings, it does not abrogate a railroad's duty of care to the 
public when a crossing is "more than ordinarily hazardous." Walker v. Union Pacific R. 
Co.. 844 P.2d 335, 340-42 (Utah App. 1993); Wilde v. Denver & Rio Grande Western 
R.R. Co.. No. C-83-149J. 1985 WL 17370 (D. Utah. Apr. 3. 1985V see also Duncan v. 
Union Pac. R.R. Co., 842 P.2d 832. 833 (Utah 1992V Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande 
Western R.R.. 749 P.2d 660. 662-63 (Utah App. 1988): English v. Southern Pacific Co.. 
45 P. 47 (1896V1 Instead, Utah law recognizes that when a crossing is ultra-hazardous a 
railroad has a duty to adequately warn motorists of the existence of railroad crossings 
and of the approach of trains: "Tf a crossing is more than ordinarily hazardous, the 
railroad cannot simply ignore the fact and put the public in peril until the Department of 
Transportation acts. Until the department acts, the reasonable care standard requires the 
railroad to take other measures to reduce the risks of a crossing commensurate with the 
risks it imposes upon the public.9" Walker. 844 P.2d at 341 n. 6 (quoting Wilde, No. 
C-83-149J, slipop. at3). 
A crossing is deemed ultra-hazardous "if, for any reason, devices employed at the 
Crossing [are] rendered inadequate to warn the public of the danger." Duncan. 842 P.2d 
1
 The Railroad Defendants duty to provide adequate warning also arises under 
Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-11. This statute provides: "Every railroad company shall be 
liable for damages caused by its neglect to make and maintain good and sufficient 
crossings at points where any line of travel crosses its road." Making and maintaining 
"good and sufficient" crossings would necessarily include providing an appropriate level 
of protection at ultra-hazardous crossings. 
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at 834; see also Walker. 844 P.2d at 342. In this case, the district court properly assumed 
for purposes of deciding Defendants' motions for summary judgment that the Crossing 
was ultra-hazardous and needed additional crossing protection. (R. at 1267; 1274.) In 
fact, there is ample evidence that the Crossing is more than ordinarily hazardous: the 
configuration of the track provides poor visibility of oncoming trains, the Crossing is 
used by a high volume of high-speed trains, and the then-existent warning signs were 
faded and improperly positioned. (See. Section V, <H 11 -13.) 
Thus, assuming that the Crossing is ultra-hazardous (see. Schnuphase v. 
Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476. 477 (Utah 1996) (assuming all facts and inferences in 
light most favorable to nonmoving party)), the Railroad Defendants had the duty to take 
measures to reduce the risk of the Crossing "commensurate with the risks" the Crossing 
imposes upon the public. Walker. 844 P.2d at 341 n. 6. These "commensurate 
measures" include a number of different options. Among these options, the Railroad 
Defendants could have ordered train crews to use extra caution on approach to the 
Crossing or they could have issued a slow order to train crews requiring them to slow 
down at the Crossing until adequate warning devices were installed.2 See Wilde. 
C-83-149J. 1985 WL 17370 * 3; see also R. at 1032-33, Clendenen Aff. Because the 
district court did not impose upon the Railroad Defendants a duty to take measures to 
2
 Other "commensurate measure" might include providing a flagman at the 
Crossing or ceasing operations over the Crossing until adequate crossing warning 
devices were installed. Also, Southern Pacific could have altered the design of the 
Crossing. 
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warn or protect the public commensurate with the risks posed at the Crossing, this Court 
should reverse the district court's order. Whether the Railroad Defendants breached this 
duty by not taking "commensurate measures" is a question of fact for the jury to decide. 
Kitchen v. Cal Gas Co.. 821 P.2d 458. 461 (Utah App. 1991) ("[t]he issue of... [a] 
breach of a legal duty is normally a question of fact for the jury. Accordingly, summary 
judgment is generally improper on the issue of negligence and only in clean-cut cases, 
with the exercise of great caution should a court take the issue of negligence from the 
province of the jury.99). r 
In addition to slow orders, special crew warnings, and other alternatives, the 
possible "commensurate measures99 could also include installing automatic lights and 
gates. Under Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-15.1. UDOT is vested with the authority to govern 
the installation of automatic warning devices at railroad crossings. However, this statute 
does not preclude railroads from installing these devices at their own volition. While 
railroads may be required under this statute to obtain UDOT's permission to install 
automatic warning devices, once obtained, the railroads may install these warning 
devices at their own expense. (R. 998-1000, Hunter Aff.; and R. at 1002-04, Jerez Aff.) 
The fact that UDOT governs the installation of automatic warning systems does not 
permit railroads to sit on their hands and wait for UDOT to issue a direct order before 
seeking to install automatic devices: they are free to seek permission at any time.3 
3
 This duty is different than that discussed in Duncan. 842 P.2d at 834. In 
Duncan, the petitioners argued, unsuccessfully, that the railroad had a duty to petition 
UDOT to improve warnings at a crossing (which was not ultra-hazardous) and to change 
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Moreover, it would simply be inconsistent to impose upon railroads a duty to take 
measures commensurate with the risk at ultra-hazardous crossings and then preclude 
them from choosing to meet that obligation by installing lights and gates. Here, 
installing automatic warning devices at the Crossing is exactly what UDOT envisioned 
and approved: as early as 1979 UDOT determined that the Crossing required automatic 
protection. (R. at 949-51.) 
The U.S. Supreme Court agrees that railroads retain joint responsibility for the 
installation of adequate warning devices. CSX Transportation. Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 
U.S. 658 0993). In Easterwood, the Supreme Court held that railroads are not relieved 
of their common law duty to maintain the safety of grade crossings simply because final 
authority over the actual installation of safety devices rests with state and local 
governments. Id. at 664 n. 5 & 666-67. The Court stated that: "While final authority for 
the installation of particular safety devices at grade crossings has long rested with state 
and local governments . . . this allocation of authority . . . does not relieve the railroads of 
their duty to take all reasonable precautions to maintain grade crossing safety . . . 
including, for example, identifying and bringing to the attention of the relevant 
authorities dangers posed by particular crossings." Id 
In this case, the district court attempted to distinguish the Supreme Court's ruling 
by concluding that the issue in Easterwood was federal preemption of a common law 
the "priority index" for crossing improvements. IJL The duty here, however, is not to 
urge UDOT to improve the warnings or change priorities. Instead, the duty is to seek 
permission from UDOT for the railroad itself to install the automatic gates and lights. 
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duty and not "whether, in the context of a state statutory scheme which vests exclusive 
responsibility for crossing design with state government, a railroad nevertheless 
r 
continues to have a historical common law shared duty." (R. at 1273.) However, the 
district court has confused the statutory scheme with the common law duty. In Utah, the 
statutory scheme directs that UDOT is the governing authority for determining the need 
for and type of improvements to automatic warning devices. In Easterwood, the 
Supreme Court interpreted a Georgia statute, which also directed that no person shall 
place or maintain railroad warning signs on public highways. Easterwood 507 U.S. at 
664 n. 5 (referring to Georgia Code.Ann. § 40-6-25). The statutory scheme in this case 
is substantially similar to the Georgia statutory scheme interpreted by the Supreme 
Court. On the other hand, the longstanding common law duty in the State of Utah is that 
railroads take reasonable precautions to reduce the risks posed by ultra-hazardous 
crossings. See Bridges v. Union Pacific, 488 P.2d 738-40 (1971): English. 45 P. at 47-
50. This Utah common law duty is the same type of duty to which the Supreme Court 
referred in Easterwood and found that railroads retain, despite the fact that a state or local 
authority may be responsible for actually placing a warning device onto the highway.4 
4
 The U.S. Department of Transportation concurs, stating that it "has never . . . 
abandoned] the com:* .on law of'joint responsibility' in favor of a scheme vesting in 
States the exclusive a. ;> to provide adequate warning devices at grade crossings." (R. 
at 867, 1022-24.) The Federal Railroad Administration ("FRA") agrees, stating that any 
rule alleviating railroa^ from their duty to provide adequate warning at public crossings 
will not best serve the public (R. at 1030; see R. at 867-68,1026.) 
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The district court's definition of a railroad's scope of duty at ultra-hazardous 
crossings does not make sense. According to the district court, a railroad's duty at an 
ultra-hazardous crossing is confined only to abating dangerous conditions over which it 
has control-such as trees, bushes, dirt mounds, and railroad cars. (R. at 1274.) This 
conclusion is unsupportable because railroads, as owners or occupiers of property, have 
a duty to abate unreasonably dangerous conditions in their control regardless of the ultra-
hazardous nature of a crossing. Schulz v. Ouintana. 756 P.2d 855. 856 (Utah 1978). 
Utah law makes clear that a railroad's duties associated with an ultra-hazardous crossing 
go beyond the general duty of occupiers or owners of property. According to the Utah 
Supreme Court, "if, for any reason, devices employed at [a] crossing [are] rendered 
inadequate to warn the public of the danger of an approaching train," a duty to take 
"measures commensurate" with the risk at the crossing will attach. Duncan, 842 P.2d at 
834. The district court simply imposed the wrong duty upon the Railroad Defendants. 
In sum, because the Crossing is ultra-hazardous, the Railroad Defendants have a 
duty to take measures to protect the public "commensurate with the risks" at the 
Crossing. Defendants might have met this duty by issuing a slow order or special crew 
instructions, installing lights and gates, or taking some equally effective action. Whether 
the Railroad Defendants actually met this duty is a question of fact. Duncan. 790 P.2d at 
598 ("The railroad is required to take precautions to prevent injury to crossing motorists 
if a reasonable person in the railroad's position would take such precautions.") Because 
the parties dispute whether the Railroad Defendants provided "commensurate measures," 
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summary judgment is simply inappropriate. Utah R. Civ. Pro. 56(c); Draper Citv v. 
Estate of Bernardo> 888 P.2d 1097. 1100-01 (Utah 1995): Kitchen. 821 P.2d at 461: see 
Wilde, No. C-83-149J, slip op. at 3 ("[I]f a fact finder determines that the conditions 
around the grade crossing do render the warning employed at the Crossing . . . 
inadequate to warn the public of danger, the fact finder is then in the position to 
determine whether the railroad exercised reasonable care in running a train through the 
Crossing without taking further precautions."). 
B. The District Court Erred In Holding that the Railroad Defendants 
Had No Duty to Reduce the Train's Speed Over The Crossing. 
The district court erred in holding that the Railroad Defendants did not have a 
duty to slow the train's speed at the Crossing and that the Parents' excessive speed claim 
was preempted by federal law. (R. at 1267-70.) To clarify the issues, the Parents do not 
contend that the speed limit for the track was excessive or that the Railroad Defendants 
should have lowered the track speed generally for the track. Instead, the Parents' claim 
relating to train speed are two-fold: (1) the Railroad Defendants should have required the 
train crew to reduce its speed over the Crossing because of the ultra-hazardous nature of 
the Crossing; and (2) the train crew should have reduced its speed by braking once it 
became concerned about the safety of the three approaching vehicles. 
1. The Railroad Defendants Had a Duty to Lower the Train Speed, 
As discussed in the previous section, Utah law imposes upon railroads the duty to 
take all necessary protective measures at ultra-hazardous crossings commensurate with 
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the risks the crossing imposes upon the public. Walker. 844 P.2d at 341 n. 6. These 
"commensurate measures," logically enough, include reducing a train's speed through a 
slow order. See Wilde, C-83-149J. 1985 WL 17370 * 3 (railroad may issue slow order 
to reduce risks at ultra-hazardous crossings). Because the district court failed to hold the 
Railroad Defendants to this duty, the district court's order should be reversed. A jury 
may then consider whether the Railroad Defendants breached their duty of care owed to 
the Decedents by not issuing a slow order at the Crossing. Kitchen, 821 P.2d at 461. 
This Court should also correct the district courts erroneous holding that under 
CSX Transportation Co. v. Easterwood. 507 U.S. 658, 673-74 (1993) the Parents' 
negligence claim based on the speed of the train is preempted by federal law. (R. at 
1268-70.). In Easterwood, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the 
FRA's regulations setting maximum track speeds preempted state negligence law 
regarding excessive speed claims. 507 U.S. at 673-75.5 In reviewing the applicable 
statute, 45 U.S.C. $ 434 (repealed 1994) and the FRA's regulations, the Easterwood 
5
 Although there is a maximum speed for a particular class of track, there is no 
"federal speed limit" for railroad tracks. See 62 Fed. Reg. 36, 143 and 36, 144 (1997) 
(discussing 49 C.F.R. Part 213 (regulations regarding track speed)). The FRA has stated 
that "[notwithstanding some of the language in Easterwood that a cursory reading may 
otherwise indicate, FRA has never assumed the task of setting train speed." Instead, a 
railroad is free to set any speed it sees fit within the regulatory framework. 49 C.F.R. § 
213.9. The only federal requirement concerning is that a railroad maintain the track in a 
certain condition pursuant to FRA requirements to accommodate the speed that the 
railroad sets. (Id) In this case, Defendants maintained the track to allow a "track 
speed" of 80 mph, which means that the track must be maintained to certain standards 
that will allow trains to operate at that speed. Despite the track speed, the railroads set a 
lower, 70 mph speed, called "time table speed," for track at which trains actually run at. 
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Court held that the regulations setting maximum track speeds precluded additional state 
regulation on speed, including state tort law. 507 U.S. at 673-75. 
However, Easterwood's holding does not give railroads the right to run their trains 
at any speed regardless of the hazards. Under the current statutory framework: 
A State may adopt or continue in force an additional or more stringent law, 
regulation, or order related to railroad safety when the law, regulation, or 
order-( 1) is necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety 
hazard 
49 U.S.C. S 20106 (1994): see also Easterwood 507 U.S. at 1743 n. 15. Thus, an 
exception to federal preemption exists to eliminate or reduce an "essentially local safety 
hazard." A "local safety hazard" is a hazard that "cannot be statewide in character and 
cannot be capable of being adequately encompassed within uniform, national standards." 
O'Bannon v. Union Pacific R.R.. 960 F. Supp. 1411. 1420-21 (W.D. Mo. 1997). Ultra-
hazardous crossings amply fit within the scope of this definition. For example, in Stone 
v. CTX Transportation. 37 F. Supp. 2d 789, 796 (S.D.W.V. 1999), the court concluded 
that a crossing at which the sight lines were poor and the warning devices were 
ineffective would, as a matter of law, be considered a "local safety hazard." 
As in Stone, the conditions of the Crossing alleged by the Parents to be ultra-
hazardous-the configuration of the Crossing, the high volume of high-speed trains using 
the Crossing, and ineffective safety devices-render the Crossing a "local safety hazard." 
These conditions are all specific to the Crossing and cannot be adequately addressed 
within national standards. This type of local hazard is precisely the type envisioned by 
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Congress to not be preempted. See also Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Lemon, 861 
S.W.2d 50L 510 (Tex. App. 1993) (no federal pre-emption pursuant to Easterwood 
when visibility of a railroad crossing is obstructed). 
Also, categorizing ultra-hazardous crossings under the "local safety hazard" 
exception is good public policy and makes sense. Railroads should not be permitted to 
run their trains at high speed through more than ordinarily hazardous crossings without 
taking action to reduce those hazards. Utah law already recognizes this principle and 
imposes upon railroads a duty of care to take all necessary protective measures at ultra-
hazardous crossings "commensurate with the risks" the crossing imposes upon the 
public. This duty has already been interpreted to include reducing a train's speed. See 
Wilde. C-83-149J. 1985 WL 17370 * 3. If ultra-hazardous crossings were not 
recognized under the "local safety hazard" exception, and therefore speed claims for 
accidents in such crossings were preempted, the possible "commensurate measures" to 
be taken by a railroad would become quantitatively and qualitatively diminished. 
The district court rejected the Parents' argument that the ultra-hazardous nature of 
the Crossing constituted a "local safety hazard" because, according to the district court; 
the FRA considers the adequacy of warning devices in determining the track 
classification. (R. at 1270.) The Court's reasoning, however, is flawed. The district 
court improperly focused on the FRA's purported consideration of the variations of the 
warning devices. The Parents, however, are not claiming that the passive warning 
devices by themselves constitute a "local safety hazard." 
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Instead, it is the conditions of the Crossing that make the Crossing ultra-hazardous 
with inadequate protection from or warning of those hazards that render the Crossing a 
"local safety hazard." Regardless of the FRA's consideration of the "possible variations 
of warning devices" in determining the track classification (R. at 1270), the FRA 
certainly did not anticipate that those devices might be worn and improperly placed-as is 
the case here. Instead, the FRA would have assumed that the warning devices were fully 
operational. When warning devices, passive or active, do not function as intended, are 
unreasonably worn, improperly placed, or otherwise rendered ineffective, those 
conditions contribute to the hazard of an crossing. Moreover, there is no evidence in the 
record indicating that the FRA was aware of the other conditions (visibility restraints, 
etc.) that made this Crossing ultra-hazardous when setting the track speed. 
In sum, an ultra-hazardous crossing may constitute a "local safety hazard" under 
49U.S.C. § 20106. Accordingly, the district court improperly concluded that the 
Parents' excessive speed claim was preempted by federal law. The issue of whether the 
Railroad Defendants breached their duty by not ordering trains to reduce their speed over 
the Crossing is a question of fact for a jury to decide. Kitchen, 821 P.2d at 461. 
2. The Crew Had the Duty to Brake Once Becoming Aware that 
the Larrabee Vehicle Might Cross in Front of the Train, 
The district court erroneously held that Amtrak's train crew had no duty to slow 
or brake the train on approach to the Crossing before the collision. (R. at 1276-78.) 
Under Utah law, a train engineer may generally assume that a person on or approaching a 
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crossing will "exercise ordinary care and take reasonable precautions for his own safety." 
Lawrence v. Bamberger R.R.. 282 P.2d 335, 338 (Utah 1955). However, this limited 
duty of care will be expanded under certain circumstances. 
First, Utah law recognizes that "[i]f... anything appears so that [the crew 
operating the crane] either knows or should know that there is a likelihood of danger to a 
person near the tracks, it becomes his duty to use all reasonable efforts to give warnings, 
to slacken his speed, and if possible, to stop in time to avert an accident." Id.; see also 
MUJI 8.4 (recognizing that a train crew has a duty to operate a train with reasonable 
care); MUJI 8.3 (recognizing that a train crew has a duty to reduce the speed of the train 
if it reasonably appears that a motorist is unaware of the approaching train); MUJI 8.5 
(recognizing that a train crew has a duty to slow down if it concludes that a motorist is 
not aware of the approaching train or is not going to yield the right-of-way). 
The district court's grant of summary judgment was improper because there are 
disputed issues of material fact as to when the engineers knew or should have known that 
the Larrabee vehicle might try to cross the tracks in front of the train and possibly be hit. 
Utah R. Civ. Pro. 56 (c); Draper City. 888 P.2d at 1100 ("On a motion for summary 
judgment, a trial court... sole inquiry should be whether material issues of fact exist."). 
It was widely recognized that the Crossing was extremely hazardous because of its poor 
sight lines. (See Section V, ^  12.b.) Accordingly, a jury could determine that the train 
crew should have know the cars might not be able to see it approaching the Crossing. 
Moreover, Amtrak's train crew admitted that they believed well in advance of the 
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Crossing that the approaching vehicles might drive in front of their train and get hit. If 
anything, it is undisputed that the crew knew the Larrabee vehicle would cross in front of 
the train and possibly be hit. The train crew saw the three vehicles approaching in a 
caravan well in advance of the Crossing and knew at least 1500 feet before the Crossing 
that the cars' occupants might not be aware of the approaching train or might cross in 
front of the train and be hit. (R. at 1006, Thornley Dep. at p. 53-56; R. at 1012-14, 
Maxfield Dep. at p. 61-62.) If the train crew had remained vigilant and had applied safe 
train handling methods, the collision might have been avoided. (R. at 1038-39, Byrnes 
Aff.) Under these facts, a jury could reasonably find that the crew should have braked, 
and therefore summary judgment was improper. Kitchen, 821 P.2d at 461. 
Second, when a crossing is more than ordinarily hazardous, a train crew may not 
assume that a motorist is able to see and hear the approaching train and will stop. See 
MUJI 8.5. Thus, assuming that the Crossing was more than ordinarily hazardous, (see R. 
at 1267, 1274), the train crew did not have, as a matter of law, the right to assume that 
the Decedents were able to see and hear the approaching train and would stay stopped at 
the Crossing. Instead, if the Crossing was ultra-hazardous, Amtrak had a duty to take all 
"commensurate measures" to protect the public, including braking. Walker. 844 P.2d at 
341 n.6. Because the district court misapplied the Railroad Defendants' duty of care, 
summary judgment was improper. 
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C. The District Court Erred in Holding that Amtrak Did Not Have a 
Duty to Provide Adequate Audible Warning of the Train's Approach. 
The district court held as a matter of law that Amtrak had no duty to sound the 
train's emergency whistle pattern when approaching the Crossing. In doing so, the 
district court applied the wrong duty of care. Under Utah law, a train engineer may 
generally assume that a person on or approaching a crossing will "exercise ordinary care 
and take reasonable precautions for his own safety." Lawrence, 282 P.2d at 338. 
However, "[i]f... anything appears so that [the crew operating the crane] either knows 
or should know that there is a likelihood of danger to a person near the tracks, it becomes 
his duty to use all reasonable efforts to give warnings, to slacken his speed, and if 
possible, to stop in time to avert an accident." Id. 
Thus, under Lawrence, if the crew suspected that the cars' occupants were 
unaware of the train's approach, the train crew had a duty to "use all reasonable efforts" 
to warn those individuals, which includes giving adequate audible warning with the horn. 
Here, as discussed above, there exists a factual dispute of whether the crew knew or 
should have known of the likelihood of danger to the Decedents. In fact, the train crew's 
undisputed testimony is that they were concerned the vehicles might cross in front of 
them and be hit approximately 1500 feet before the crossing. (See_Section V, Tf 8.) 
From this testimony, a reasonable jury could find that the train crew knew or should have 
known the Decedents were in danger. Moreover, Amtrak had a duty to take all measures 
"commensurate with" the risks posed at the Crossing, including giving an adequate 
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audible warning. Walker, 844 P.2d at 341 n. 6 Accordingly, the issue of whether the 
crew breached its duty to use "all reasonable efforts to warn" and to take "commensurate 
measures" by failing to give an adequate audible warning is a question of fact to be 
decided at trial. See Schnuphase. 918 P.2d at 477: Kitchen. 821 P.2d at 461. 
The district court improperly found that Amtrak had no duty to sound the train *s 
whistle because "there [was] no evidence that the train was incapable of being seen." (R. 
at 1275.) This is a misstatement and a misapplication of the law. Utah law does not 
provide that a railroad's duty to "use all reasonable efforts to warn" or to take 
"commensurate measures" is abrogated when a train is capable of being seen. Nor does 
it make sense to. A train crew is in a poor position to judge whether the train can 
actually be seen. However, they are in a good position to judge whether there is a 
likelihood of danger to others near the track. It is that ability to determine a likelihood of 
danger that should, and does, give rise to a railroad's duty to warn. See Lawrence, 282 
P.2d at 338. In fact, the district court's rational for granting summary judgment because 
the train could be seen is a resurrection of the "last clear chance" doctrine, which has 
been abolished in Utah. Dixon v. Stewart. 658 P.2d 591. 598 (Utah 1982V If there is 
evidence that the train could be seen, that evidence is relevant only to determine the 
Decedents' comparative negligence; it will not affect Amtrak's duty or bar recovery. Id. 
Even if the visibility of the train were relevant in determining whether a train must 
give adequate audible warning, the district court's conclusion that "there is no evidence 
that the train was incapable of being seen" is simply incorrect. There is ample evidence 
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that the Amtrak train was not reasonably visible. The Crossing's configuration has a 
"very bad crossing angle." (R. at 896.) This configuration provides "poor sight 
distances" (id.) and make a driver's visibility of an oncoming train "deceptive and 
difficult." (R. at 889-92, Burnham Aff.) Moreover, the occupants of the first car 
testified that they came to a complete stop at the stop sign, looked both ways, and could 
not see the train. (See Section V, ^  5.) Brent Larrabee's own actions (i.e., pulling onto 
the track after having stopped) are also evidence that the train was not reasonably 
capable of being seen. (See Section V ^ f 6.) The trial court erroneously ignored this 
evidence when it granted summary judgement. Schnuphase, 918 P.2d at 477. 
Finally, the Parents' claim that Amtrak failed to give adequate audible warning is 
not preempted by federal law, as the trial court concluded. (R. at 1275-76.) First, only 
the standards for horn equipment are preempted under the federal statutes and 
regulations-not the use of whistles. For example, the Locomotive Inspection Act 
49U.S.C. §§ 20701, et seg. (1997) preempts claims that the horn equipment was 
inadequate. See First Sec. Bank v. Union Pacific R. Co., 152 F.3d 877, 880 (8th Cir. 
1998). Furthermore, 49 C.F.R. § 229.129 establishes a federal minimum sound level for 
audible warning devices on locomotives. These provisions, however, do not dictate 
when and in what manner a train should sound its emergency whistle pattern.6 Those 
6
 49 U.S.C. § 20153 requires that a trains sound its horn "while each train is 
approaching and entering upon each public-highway-rail crossing." Here, it is disputed 
as to whether the train crew sounded its horn while approaching the Crossing. (See 
Section V, % 24.) 
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issues are left to state tort law. Lawrence. 282 P.2d at 338 (setting forth circumstances 
which give rise to a duty of a train crew to use all reasonable efforts to give "adequate 
warnings"); English. 45 P. 47. 49-50 (holding that statutes requiring trains to blow 
whistles and sound horns "will not relieve the railroad company from adopting such 
other reasonable measures for the public safety as common prudence may dictate, : 
considering the danger, locality, travel, and surrounding circumstances"). Thus, it is 
question of fact whether the train crew should have sounded the train whistle, whether it 
did sound the whistle, and whether it did so as to give adequate warning.7 
Second, this claim is not preempted by federal law by operation of 49 U.S.C. § 
20jli2 which allows a state to adopt more stringent laws related to railroad safety, 
including tort law, when that law "is necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local 
safety hazard." As fully argued above, the Crossing constitutes a "local safety hazard" 
because it was ultra-hazardous. Stone. 37 F. Supp. 2d at 796. Thus, state law designed to 
protect the public from those hazards is not preempted, including laws requiring railroads 
to take protective measures commensurate with the risk at the crossing. Walker. 844 
P.2d at 341 n.6. Moreover, a "local safety hazard" arises if the train crew knows or 
should know that there is a likelihood of danger to an individual near the tracks. See 
CTBannon. 960 F. Supp. at 1420 n. 10 (child in the roadway constitutes a "local safety 
7
 The proper whistle pattern to be used by trains approaching a railroad grade 
crossing is set forth in the General Code of Operating Rules. (R. at 1041-47, 1994.) 
When a train crew has reason to believe that a collision may occur, an emergency whistle 
pattern is prescribed. (R. at 1038-39, Byrnes Aff.) 
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hazard"). That is the case here. The railroad train crew knew that the vehicles were 
traveling in a manner which indicated that they were not aware of the presence of the 
train. The first vehicle in the caravan crossed the track directly in front of the train 
confirming that the train was not plainly visible. Nevertheless, the engineer failed to 
sound the train's emergency whistle pattern. (See. Section IV, ^ | 10.) A jury must decide 
whether the crew's failure to sound the train's emergency whistle pattern - - constitutes a 
breach of Amtrak's duty. 
D. The District Court Erred In Finding that the City of South Jordan 
Had No Duty To Upgrade The Warning Devices or Additional 
Protection at the Crossing and Erred in Finding that the Existing 
Warning Devices Were Adequate. 
The district court held that the City, while having a duty to "exercise reasonable 
care to warn travelers of potentially unsafe locations," had no duty to upgrade the 
warning devices or take any other measure to protect the public at the Crossing. In 
addition, ignoring ample evidence to the contrary, the district court found that the City's 
warning devices were "adequate," thereby satisfying the City's duty. (R. at 1281-83.) 
The district court erred on both counts. Initially, the court erred to defining the 
scope of the City's duty. In Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light 969 P.2d 403. 406 (TJtah 
1998}, the Utah Supreme Court addressed the scope of a municipality's duty to warn the 
public of dangerous conditions on public streets. In particular, Fishbaugh addressed 
whether a municipality has a duty to light its streets. While the court found that a 
municipality has no duty to light its streets generally, it recognized that a municipality 
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has "the clear duty to maintain its streets reasonably safe for travel." Id. at 406. The 
court also found that "[i]n conjunction with this duty, a municipality also has a duty to 
warn of dangerous conditions on its streets." LdL; see 39 Am.Jur.2d § 397 ("It is the duty 
of the responsible public authority to exercise reasonable care to warn travelers of 
defects, obstructions, and unsafe places in its streets."). This duty requires a municipality 
to provide "reasonably sufficient" warning to warn travelers of the hazardous condition, 
and may encompass "various mediums, including the use of lights." Id. Thus, the court 
concluded: "[a] duty to light, and the consequent liability for failure to do so, may ... 
arise from some peculiar condition rendering lighting necessary in order to make the 
streets safe for travel. Therefore, if there is a hazardous condition on the street requiring 
lighting, a municipality would have the duty to light the street and to maintain such 
lights. Id. (citation and quotation omitted.) 
A municipalities' duty to provide "reasonably sufficient" warnings for dangerous 
conditions equally applies at railroad crossings as it does for streets generally. The 
Fishbaugh decision is clear: municipalities have the duty to warn of dangerous 
conditions on streets. Thus, the relevant inquiry here is whether the City provided 
"reasonably sufficient" warnings to warn the public of the dangers at the Crossing. 
Although this is a question of fact for a jury to determine, it most likely could be 
resolved on summary judgment-in the Parents9 favor! Contrary to the district court's 
conclusions, there is ample evidence that the City did not provide "reasonably sufficient" 
warnings, both in terms of maintaining the warning devices and in terms of the level of 
SaltLake-l 14345.1 0027625-00001 4 0 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
protection. The passive warning devices in place were worn, not legible, not fully 
reflectorized, and improperly positioned so as to be not visible until a vehicle is at the 
intersection. (R. at 889, 891, Burnham Aff.) Furthermore, as the chronology set forth 
above demonstrates, the City has know since 1979 through the voluminous 
correspondence with UDOT that the Crossing was ultra-hazardous and the level of 
protection at the Crossing needed to be upgraded to lights and gates or close the crossing. 
(See Section V, fflj 14-18.) From 1979, UDOT has pleaded with the City to pay the 
minimal amount (10% of the overall cost) to install lights and gates. The City, while 
purporting to recognize the problem, has simply avoided correcting the problem for over 
20 years. (Id) 
For example, the 1989 Study recognizes that the Crossing is "substandard" and 
proposes the installation of flashing light signals and gates. (R. at 908-10.) The 1989 
Study specifically concludes: "There are only two alternatives. Do the rehabilitation or 
do nothing. The do nothing alternative is unacceptable because existing protection is 
inadequate." (Id. at 909 (emphasis added).) Time after time, UDOT attempted to get the 
City to respond, but time after time the City refused to act. At one point, in June 1992, 
the City agreed to place additional passive warning devices at the Crossing. (R. at 896-
98, Surveillance Review.) But, true to form, the City reneged on this pledge and did 
nothing. (R. at 900; Miera Dep. at pp. 86-87.) 
The Parents' assertion that the then-existing passive warning devices were not 
"reasonably sufficient" to warn the public of the ultra-hazardous conditions at the 
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crossing are also evidenced by the testimony of the occupants in the first vehicle. These 
individuals testified that, having come to a complete stop and looking each way, they 
could not see a train. (See Section V, % 5.) Brent Larrabee's own actions also evidence 
this point. (See Section V, ^  6.) From this, a jury reasonably could-and probably 
will-conclude that the City did not provide "reasonably sufficient" warnings to the 
public. Because the district court applied the wrong duty of care and ignored all of the 
evidence that the warning devices were inadequate, this Court should reverse the district 
court's order granting the City's motion for summary judgment. 
E. The District Court Erred In Striking the Affidavits of Archie 
Burnham, Jr., Randy S. Hunter. Orlando Jerez, J. Clark Clenenden, 
and Paul F. Byrnes. 
The district court erroneously struck the affidavits of Archie Burnham, Jr., Randy 
S. Hunter, Orlando Jerez, J. Clark Clenenden, and Paul F. Byrnes.8 (R. at 63-65.) Expert 
affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must comport with 
both Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Accordingly, such affidavits must be made on personal knowledge, set forth such facts as 
would be admissible in evidence, and show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to 
testify to the matters stated in the affidavit. U.R.C.P. 56(e). Further, expert testimony, in 
the form of opinion or otherwise, is admissible "if scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
8
 Regardless of the adequacy of these affidavits, there is sufficient evidence in the 
record to reverse the district court's order. 
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determine a fact in issue," provided the expert is qualified through knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education. Utah R. Evid. 702. The facts or data upon which an 
expert bases an opinion or inference need not be admissible if they are of a type 
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field. Utah R. Evid. 703. 
Under Utah law, an expert's affidavit must contain both the expert's opinion and 
the specific facts that logically support that conclusion. Butterfield v. Okubo. 831 P.2d 
97, 104 (Utah 1992 V Further, the expert must identify specific instances of negligence in 
order for the expert's affidavit to comport with Rule 56(e). Id. at 105. An expert may 
rely on hearsay and other inadmissible evidence in rendering an opinion. Utah R. Evid. 
703; Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons. Inc.. 682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984 )^: Gaw v. State Dept. 
of Transp.. 798 P.2d 1130. 1137 (Utah App. 1990). For example, the court in Gaw 
stated that an expert opinion contained in an affidavit, which was based on intersection 
diagrams, police reports and photographs, the plaintiffs deposition and traffic court data, 
was proper as the facts were of a type relied upon by engineers in the field of traffic 
and/or highway design. 798 P.2d at 1137. Moreover, the expert can render opinions as 
to the ultimate issue in the case. Utah R. Evid. 704; Gaw, 798 P.2d at 1137. 
In Gaw, the court ruled that the trial court improperly struck the affidavits of 
experts who opined that an intersection was inadequately designed. The court stated that 
since the experts had identified particular aspects of the intersection and the surrounding 
area which made the intersection misleading and dangerous, the affidavits contained 
proper foundation. Gaw. 798 P.2d at 1137. n.9. The court also found that the affidavits 
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were sufficient because they stated that the intersection's design was in conflict with 
engineering practices. Id. Similarly, in Butterfield, the Utah Supreme Court found that 
an expert affidavit was sufficient to create a factual issue where the affidavit outlined 
specific facts from which the expert's theory of causation could be inferred. Butterfield, 
831 P.2d at 106. The affidavits submitted by the Parents fully complied with these rules. 
1. Affidavit of Archie C. Burnham. Jr. (R. at 889-92). 
The district court incorrectly concluded that the averments of Mr. Burnham in 
paragraphs 8, 12, 13, and 14 were irrelevant and, accordingly, inadmissible. (R. at 
1263.) As required by Butterfield, Mr. Burnham's affidavit contained conclusions 
logically supported by specific facts. Mr. Burnham reviewed the accident report, 
photographs, the Crossing's accident history, and the depositions and statements of the 
affected parties. In addition, he conducted an on-site inspection and evaluation of the 
Crossing. (See also R. at 1149-55.) His conclusions in paragraphs 12, 13, and 14 were 
based on his review of these materials and his inspection. As stated in Gaw, this is the 
type of information relied upon by experts in the field. Paragraph 8 properly set forth the 
standard by which he analyzes the degree of hazard of a crossing, so that the finder of 
fact understands the factors involved in his analysis. Mr. Burnham's analysis then 
compared the traffic control devices in existence at the time of the accident against the 
guidelines set forth in his Affidavit. Finally, based on his review of the above materials, 
his own observations and inspection, his knowledge, training, and experience, and upon 
well recognized and accepted engineering principles, he properly identifies specific 
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instances of negligence. Gaw. 798 P.2d at 1137. Consequently, his affidavit fully 
complied with the rules set forth above and are admissible. 
2. Affidavits of Randv S. Hunter (R. at 998-1000) and Orlando 
Jerez (R. at 1002-04). 
The district court incorrectly concluded that the averments of Randy S. Hunter 
and Orlando Jerez in paragraphs 6 and 8 of their affidavits constitute inadmissible 
conclusions of law. (R. at 1263-64.) Mr. Hunter is the Liability and Litigation 
Coordinator for UDOT. Mr. Jerez is the UDOT's Engineering Coordinator for Railroads 
and Utilities. Paragraphs 6 and 8 of their affidavits did not constitute conclusions of law, 
but were merely statements of fact within the particular knowledge of these experts due 
to the nature of their respective positions. For example, paragraph 8 provides that the 
railroad "is free to install proper and adequate train-activated flashers and gates at any 
crossing it desires on its system at its own volition and expense." (R. at 1000 and 1004.) 
This statement is factual and was averred based upon the affiants' personal knowledge 
that railroads can and do actually install warning devices at their own expense. Thus, the 
district court's order striking these affidavits must be reversed. 
3. Affidavit of J. Clark Clendenen CR. at 1032-33V 
The district court incorrectly found that paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 of Mr. Clendenen's 
affidavit were irrelevant and, accordingly inadmissible, and that paragraphs 3 and 5 of 
the affidavit constituted inadmissible conclusions of law. (R. at 1264-65.) Contrary to 
the district court's ruling, Mr. Cleneden averments were not irrelevant and did not 
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purport to give legal conclusions. Rather, Mr. Clendenen's affidavit set forth some 
duties of the trainmaster and some of the actions that can be taken by a trainmaster to 
enhance safety at railroad crossings. The information was based on Mr. Clendenen's 
personal knowledge and experience in the railroad industry as a career railroad 
employee, locomotive engineer and train master. The affidavit identifies two specific 
instances of negligence. Finally, Mr. Clendenen concludes that it is more likely than not 
that the accident would not have happened had the trainmaster alerted train crews to the 
dangers of this Crossing and initiated a head end slow order. These conclusions are 
properly set forth in the affidavits under Utah law. 
4. Affidavit of Paul F. Bvrnes (R. at 1038-39). 
The district court incorrectly found that the averments in Mr. Byrnes affidavit 
constituted inadmissible conclusions of law or, in the alternative, were irrelevant and 
therefore inadmissible. (R. at 1265.) In Paragraphs 4 and 5, Mr. Byrnes, a former 
Amtrak locomotive engineer himself, concludes that Engineer Thornley had a duty to 
control the speed of the train as he approached the Crossing and that it is more likely 
than not that Engineer Thornely's failure to set the brakes caused or contributed to the 
collision. These conclusions are logically supported by the facts stated in the affidavit, to 
wit: Engineer Thornley was familiar with the intersection; three vehicles were traveling 
together late at night on new years eve; the stated concerns of Engineer Maxfield as he 
watched the three vehicles approach the grade crossing; and the expert's own knowledge 
regarding braking response in passenger trains. The opinions were not hindsight, but 
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were based upon the expert's knowledge of what a reasonably prudent engineer would 
have done in the same or similar circumstances. 
Furthermore, Paragraphs 6 and 7 are helpful to the trier of fact. As stated in the 
affidavit, the General Code of Operating Rules, which governs Amtrak trains in this 
situation, required the engineer to sound the proper emergency warning signal to 
communicate the presence of the oncoming train. Paragraph 6 does nothing more that 
identify a specific instance of negligence as required by Butterfield. supra. Paragraph 7 
concluded that the failure to comply with this duty was the proximate cause of the 
accident. The affidavit contained relevant averments which did not constitute 
inadmissible conclusions of law. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the district court's order granting the Defendants' 
motions for summary judgment because the district court imposed the wrong duties of 
care upon the Defendants and ignored the disputed issues of material fact. The district 
court erroneously restricted the Railroad Defendants' duty to warn of hazardous 
conditions at railroad crossings. Utah law is clear that a railroad's duty is much broader 
at ultra-hazardous crossings than the district court concluded. At such crossings, such as 
the Crossing at issue, railroads have a duty to take measures to protect the public that are 
commensurate with the risks posed at the crossing. There are a variety of actions a 
railroad could take to satisfy this duty including, among others: installing automatic 
lights and gates, posting flagmen, issuing a slow order, changing the configuration of the 
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crossing, suspending use until the hazardous conditions are corrected, ordering crews to 
use extra-precaution, sounding the emergency horn pattern, and braking when necessary. 
Here, the Railroad Defendants took none of these measures to avoid the collision with 
Brent, Jamie, and Aaron. Whether the Railroad Defendants breached their duty to take 
"commensurate measures" by failing to take these actions is a question of fact for a jury 
todecide. 
In addition, if the train crew knew or should have known of the likelihood of 
danger to Brent, Jamie, and Aaron, then the crew had the duty to "use all reasonable 
efforts to give warnings and slacken . . . speed." Here, there is ample evidence in the 
crew's own testimony that they knew the Decedents faced a likelihood of danger at the 
Crossing. Whether they used all reasonable efforts to warn or to reduce their speed is a 
question of fact for a jury. 
Finally, the Court misapplied Utah law when defining and applying the scope of 
the City's duty. Although the district court recognized that the City must "maintain its 
streets in reasonably safe condition ad to exercise reasonable care to warn of unsafe 
locations," the court misapplied this duty. A municipality has a duty to provide 
"reasonably sufficient" warnings to warn the public of hazardous conditions on public 
streets. In certain circumstances, this may include installing street lights, or, in the case 
of ultra-hazardous railroad crossings, installing automatic lights and gates or taking some 
similarly effective action. Whether the City breached this duty by failing to take 
"commensurate measures" is a question of fact for the jury. In fact, there is sufficient 
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evidence that since 1979, the City has known that the Crossing was extremely hazardous, 
known that the Crossing needed automatic lights if it were to stay open and operational, 
and agreed that the dangerous conditions needed be corrected. Despite this, however, the 
City did nothing. A jury should be allowed to decide whether the City's inaction 
constituted a breach of its duty of care owed to Brent, Jamie, and Aaron. 
For these reasons and those stated above, this Court should reverse the trial 
court's order granting the Defendants' motions for summary judgement, and the matter 
should be remanded to the district court to proceed to trial. 
- & DATED this LST day of January, 2000. 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
u )avid J. Jordan Mark E. Hindley 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DANIEL D. PRICE, SUSANNE Q. 
PRICE, KENT SWENSEN, KAY 
SWENSEN, ROSS LARRABEE, and 
CARMA LARRABEE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER 
CORPORATION, SOUTHERN PACIFIC 
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, a 
Delaware Corporation, and CITY 
OF SOUTH JORDAN, a Utah 
Municipal Corporation, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 970903387WD 
Honorable ANNE M. STIRBA 
Court Clerk: Marcy Thorne 
May 4, 1999 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
two motions for summary judgment against plaintiffs, Daniel D. 
Price, Susanne Q. Price, Kent Swensen, Kay Swensen, Ross Larrabee, 
and Carma Larrabee (hereafter collectively referred to as 
VNplaintif f s." The railroad defendants in the case are National 
Railroad Corporation (hereafter referred to as "Amtrak") and 
Southern Pacific Transportation Company (hereafter referred to as 
"Southern Pacific")1 (Amtrak and Southern Pacific hereafter 
'Southern Pacific Transportation Company was a corporate 
entity that was a railroad. The Denver & Rio Grande Western 
Railroad Company was a separate corporate entity that also was a 
railroad. In approximately 1990 and through the relevant time 
period, these two corporate railroads merged to do business as 
Southern Pacific Lines. Thereafter these corporations were 
f\ A C\T- r\ 
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PRICE v. NATIONAL RAILROAD Page 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
collectively referred to as "railroad defendants'7) . The City of 
South Jordan (hereafter referred to as "South Jordan") is the 
remaining defendant. The railroad defendants have moved for 
summary judgment and South Jordan has moved for summary judgment. 
All of the defendants have moved to strike portions of one or more 
of the affidavits filed by plaintiffs. 
The Court heard oral argument with respect to all of these 
motions on February 25, 1999. However, on the day following oral 
argument, February 26, 1999, plaintiffs requested that the Court 
re-open the record to consider a supplemental memorandum entitled 
"Plaintiffs' Supplement to Oral Argument in Opposition to Defendant 
City of South Jordan's Motion for Summary Judgment." -Based upon 
plaintiffs' request, the Court did re-open the record for 
consideration of plaintiffs' supplemental memorandum as well as 
defendant South Jordan's responsive memorandum entitled "Defendant 
South Jordan City's Response to Plaintiffs' ^Supplement to Oral 
Argument,'" which was filed on March 10, 1999, Thereafter, the 
record was closed and the Court took the matter under advisement. 
The Court, having now considered the motions, memoranda and 
the good cause that has been shown, hereby enters the following 
acquired by Union Pacific Railroad Company and no longer exist as 
separate corporate entities. In this action, references made to 
any of these three railroads pertain to defendant Southern 
Pacific. 
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ruling. 
Undisputed Statements of Fact 
At 11:30 p.m., on December 31, 1995, three teenagers, Brent 
Larrabee, Jamie Swensen and Aaron Price (hereafter collectively 
referred to as "decedents") tragically were killed when the 
automobile in which they were traveling was struck by the lead 
locomotive of a train that was owned and operated by Amtrak. The 
railroad track at the site of the collision, 10200 South 300 West, 
South Jordan, Utah, was then owned and maintained by Southern 
Pacific. Brent Larrabee was driving the automobile, and Jamie 
Swensen and Aaron Price were passengers in the car. 
The collision occurred where 10200 South crosses over Southern 
Pacific's main line track west of Interstate 1-15. A frontage 
road, 300 West, parallels the track to the west between 10600 South 
and 10200 South. At 10200 South, 300 West makes an "S" turn by 
turning right (east), crosses over the track, and then turns left 
(north) and continues to run parallel to the track but on the east 
side. 
At the time of the collision, a stop sign, crossbucks and 
advance stop and railroad crossing signs were posted for motorists 
traveling from either direction to advise them of the existence of 
the stop sign, track and intersecting road. From the stop sign on 
the west side of the crossing the railroad track to the south, the 
ni O C H 
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direction from which the Amtrak train was traveling, is straight 
for more than one-half mile. 
Railroad grade crossings have three basic levels of 
protection. The lowest level of protection is known as "passive 
protection" and consists of advance warning signs, pavement 
markings, railroad crossbuck signs and sometimes stop signs. The 
next level of protection is termed "active protection" and consists 
of automatic flashing lights and sometimes automatic gates. The 
highest level of protection is a grade separation which consists of 
either an overpass or an underpass. The subject crossing 
constituted passive protection. 
Passive protection is the lowest form of protection because it 
only identifies the location of the railroad crossing. Active 
protection informs motorists not only that they are approaching a 
railroad grade crossing but that a train is about to cross as well. 
Grade separation is considered the highest form of protection 
because it eliminates all potential for collision. 
At the time of the collision, decedents were the second of a 
three-car caravan. The first of the three cars, the Honda, had. its 
windows up and the radio playing, and the three teenagers in that 
car were talking as the Honda was driven toward the crossing. 
The second car, the Tempo, contained the three decedents. 
The third car, the Jeep, also was driven with its windows up 
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and the radio playing, and the four teenagers in that car also were 
talking as the Jeep was driven north on 300 West toward the stop 
sign just west of the crossing. 
The Honda came to a "rolling stop" at the stop sign just west 
of the crossing and then drove across the track in front of the 
approaching train, but safely making it to the other side of the 
track.
 9 
The Tempo, occupied by the decedents, came to a complete stop 
at the stop sign before crossing. However, when the Amtrak train 
was only 50 feet to 300 feet (approximately one-half second to 
three seconds at 68 miles per hour) from the crossing, Brent 
Larrabee "slowly" drove the Tempo onto the track in front of the 
train and his car was hit broadside. 
Amtrak's train crew was aware of the three cars as they were 
traveling on 300 South on the west side of the track. The lead 
locomotive's headlight was on bright. 
The decedents' friends who were in the first and third cars 
testified there were no obstructions between the railroad track and 
300 West from 10600 South to 10200 South where the crossing is 
located. The track itself is higher in elevation than the public 
road, increasing the visibility of the track. 
The Amtrak train sounded its horn prior to the collision, 
although the parties dispute precisely when in relation to the 
01262 
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location of the grade crossing at 10200 South the horn sounded. 
Motions to Strike 
With their motions, defendants seek to strike a number of 
plaintiffs' affidavits. Firstf both the railroad defendants and 
the South Jordan seek to strike the affidavit of Archie Burnham, 
Jr. P.E., arguing that his statements constitute inadmissible legal 
opinions, are vague and lack the requisite foundation. 
Based upon review of the statements, and in light of the 
analysis below regarding duty with respect to the railroad 
defendants and the City of South Jordan, it is clear the averments 
of Mr. Burnham are irrelevant, and accordingly, inadmissible. 
The railroad defendants also seek to strike several other of 
plaintiffs' affidavits. Considered in the order in which they were 
briefed, the next motion to strike focuses on the affidavits of 
Randy S. Hunter, the Liability and Litigation Coordinator for UDOT, 
and Orlando Jerez, UDOT's Engineering Coordinator. The railroad 
defendants argue that these individuals render legal opinions which 
are contrary to the Utah Supreme Court in Duncan v. Union Pacific 
R.R. Co. , 790 P.2d 595, (Utah App. 1990), aff'd. , 842 P.2d 832 (Utah 
1992) and are attempting to dictate the law to be applied in this 
case. The averments in the two affidavits themselves contain 
remarkably similar language. Based upon the Court's review of the 
two affidavits, it appears that the averments do state inadmissible 
n 1 o C O 
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conclusions of law. Accordingly, the motions to strike these two 
affidavits are granted. 
Next, the railroad defendants take issue with the affidavit of 
J. Clark Clendenen, arguing that his statements set forth legal 
opinions as to what federal regulations do and do not require with 
respect to train speed at crossings—something which Mr. Clendenen 
is not qualified to do. Moreover, it is Amtrak's position that his 
opinions regarding what may have occurred had the train gone slower 
through the crossing are irrelevant. 
Beginning with the first indented paragraph of the Clendenin 
affidavit2 (referred to herein as "Paragraph 1")/ this paragraph, 
as well as the second paragraph (referred to herein as "Paragraph 
2"), in these two paragraphs, Mr. Clendenen opines regarding 
specific actions the trainmaster could have taken to prevent an 
accident like this from happening. For the reasons set forth 
below, these statements are irrelevant and, therefore, 
inadmissible. This same reasoning applies with respect to the 
fourth paragraph (referred to herein as "Paragraph 4"). 
Accordingly, the motion to strike Paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 is granted. 
With respect to the third and fifth paragraphs (referred to 
herein as "Paragraph 3" and "Paragraph 4", respectively), these 
paragraphs constitute inadmissible conclusions of law. 
2The paragraphs are not numbered. 
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Accordingly, the motion to strike is granted. 
Finally, with regard to the affidavit of Paul F. Byrnes, a 
self-employed railroad operations consultant, the railroad 
defendants seek to strike his affidavit on the grounds that it 
consists of legal opinions and lacks foundation. To the extent Mr. 
Byrnes testifies as to the legal duty the train engineer had 
regarding to slow or brake, the statements constitute inadmissible 
conclusions of law and are stricken. To the extent Mr. Byrnes 
testifies that it is more likely than not that the engineer's 
failure to set the brakes caused or contributed to the collision, 
for the reasons discussed below this evidence is irrelevant. 
Accordingly, the motion to strike is granted with respect to this 
affidavit. 
Standard of Review 
A party is not entitled to summary judgment unless answers to 
interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law." Rule 56© of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. In reviewing the evidence and determining whether 
genuine issues of material facts exist, a court must view all facts 
and inferences therefrom in "the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party. Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476, 
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477 (Utah 1996). "On a motion for summary judgment, a trial court 
should not weigh disputed evidence, and its sole inquiry should be 
whether material issues of fact exist." Draper Citv v. Estate of 
Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1995). 
The Railroad Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
Plaintiffs' theories of liability against the railroad 
defendants are as follows: 
(1) Amtrak operated its train too fast at 
this crossing, and Southern Pacific 
allowed Amtrak to operate Amtrak's train 
too fast. Plaintiffs also allege Amtrak 
should not have operated its train 
through the crossing at any speed because 
of the "dangerous condition" of the 
crossing, and Southern Pacific should not 
have continued to use the crossing for 
this same reason. Plaintiffs also 
alleged that defendants failed to warn 
train crews of the dangers of the 
crossing so they would go slower or 
otherwise require trains to go slower 
because of the dangers of this crossing; 
(2) Amtrak should have taken steps to correct 
the unsafe condition at the crossing, and 
Southern Pacific should have installed 
"adequate and proper safety and warning 
devices and protection for the crossing." 
Specifically, plaintiffs contend that 
gates and flashing lights should have 
been installed at the crossing; 
(3) Amtrak failed to give "adequate warning" 
prior to the collision.3 Specifically, 
plaintiffs claim that no bell or horn was 
3This claim is not made against Southern Pacific because its 
train was not involved in the collision. 
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sounded and flashing lights and gates 
were not installed; 
(4) Amtrak failed to brake in a timely 
manner;4 and 
(5) Southern Pacific designed and constructed 
the crossing in a way that created an 
illusion that vehicular movement could be 
performed safely and that obscured the 
visibility of approaching trains to 
motorists approaching the crossing. 
Plaintiffs also allege that the crossing 
was not properly maintained.5 More 
specifically, plaintiffs claim the 
crossing is defective in the angle at 
which the public road and railroad track 
cross, the approach of the public road to 
the crossing with the associated visual 
clutter of background lights from nearby 
Interstate 1-15, and the lack of active 
protection (gates) to prevent motorists 
from moving onto the track when there is 
a train. There is no specific claim that 
Southern Pacific failed to maintain 
anything about its track or right of way. 
For the purpose of this motion, the railroad defendants 
concede that this crossing was ultra-hazardous and needed other 
types of crossing warning devices. 
A. The Railroad's Duty to Lower Its Speed 
As to plaintiffs' claim that the railroad defendants operated 
or allowed operation of the train at an excessive speed, Amtrak 
4This claim is not made against Southern Pacific because its 
train was not involved in the collision. 
5This claim is not made against Amtrak because Amtrak did 
not own the railroad track. 
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contends it had no legal duty to operate its train slower than it 
was traveling. 
It is well-settled in Utah that trains have the preferred and 
legal right of way at railroad grade crossings, and a driver 
approaching a crossing is required to recognize the prior right of 
the train. Lundauist v. Kennecott Copper Co., Inc., 526 P.2d 1182, 
1184 ( Utah 1972); Steele v. D. & R.G.W. R.R., 396 P.2d 751, 753 
(Utah 1954); and Holmgren v. Union Pacific R.R., 198 P.2d 459, 461 
(Utah 1948) . 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that trains must have 
the preferred right of way at crossings because a heavy, cumbersome 
train cannot physically stop on short notice or steer off the track 
of a crossing to avoid a collision: 
(b)ecause of the weight of the train, the 
impossibility of stopping within short 
distances, and the impossibility of turning to 
avoid objects in its path, the same right of 
way rule does not apply as in the case of two 
automobiles. Trains cannot be stopped in time 
to avoid collisions if the time interval is 
shortened to a matter of... seconds .... 
Van Wagoner v. Union Pacific R.R., 186 P.2d 293, 300-01 (Utah 
1947) . 
The rule that railroads have the right of way at railroad 
crossings is codified in Utah at Section 41-6-93 U.C.A. (1953), as 
amended, making it unlawful for a motorist to drive upon or across 
the tracks or the path of a train whenever the train has started to 
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cross an intersection. v 
It is undisputed in this case that in this section of track 
the federally-established speed limit was 80 miles per hour and the 
train was traveling at no more than 68 miles per hour. Although 
railroads may set their own speed limit for its track below the 
federal speed limit, the United States Supreme Court has held that 
railroads have no legal duty to operate slower than the maximum 
limit set for the "class of track" on which they operate." CSX 
Transp. Co. V. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 673-74 (1993). Any claim 
that Amtrak was operating its train too fast, when it was being 
operated below the federal speed limit, is preempted by federal 
law. .Id. Moreover, this federal preemption applies to bar states 
from allowing plaintiffs the right to recover in a lawsuit. Id. , 
at 673-675. Further, there is no exception to this preemption for 
train speed at railroad grade crossings, pursuant to 62 Fed. Reg. 
36143-44 (1997), which states, in pertinent part, that the Federal 
Railroad Administration's ("FRA") "current regulations governing 
train speed do not afford any adjustment of train speeds...at grade 
crossings...." 
The only exception to preemption of a plaintiff's speeding 
claim is when there is "an essentially local safety hazard" that 
requires a state law standard that is "not incompatible" with the 
federal standard. Id. Plaintiffs contend that the alleged 
0126S 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
PRICE v. NATIONAL RAILROAD Page 13 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
inadequacy of warning devices at the subject crossing in this case 
constitutes an "essentially local safety hazard" which justifies an 
exception to preemption. However, in promulgating its federal 
speed limit at any given crossing, the FRA considers all of the 
possible variations of warning devices for specific crossings. See 
Thompson v. CSX Trans., Inc.. F.Supp. (S.D.Miss. 1998); 
Bowman v. Norfolk S.Rv., 832 F.Supp. 1014, 1018 (D.S.C. 1993). 
Thus, a claimed inadequacy of a "warning device employed at a 
crossing is considered in the context of setting the federal speed 
limit and does not then also constitute "an essentially local 
safety hazard." 
In the absence of "an essentially local safety hazard, there 
is no exception to federal preemption. Where the federal speed 
limit prevails and a railroad operates its train within that speed 
limit, a railroad has no duty to operate the train slower. In this 
case, because it is undisputed that the train was operating at a 
speed no greater than 68 miles per hour in a federally-approved 80 
mile per hour area, the train's speed was well within approved 
limits. As a matter of law, therefore, the train's speed of 68 
miles per hour was reasonable. 
B. The Railroads' Duty to Upgrade the Warning Devices 
As to plaintiffs' claim that Amtrak should have taken steps to 
correct the unsafe condition at the crossing and that Southern 
m 97n 
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Pacific should have installed "adequate and proper safety and 
warning devices and protection for the crossing," the railroad 
defendants claim that they had no duty with respect to the safety 
of the subject crossing. 
For obvious reasons, all railroad crossings are inherently 
dangerous. Thus, the presence of a railroad track in itself is a 
"warning of danger" and places a motorist on notice that a train 
may be present or in hazardous proximity to the crossing at any 
time. Lundauist v. Kennecott Copper Co.,. 516 P. 2d at 1184. 
Historically, the railroads did have a duty to provide 
adequate warning devices at their crossings. Bridges v. Union 
Pacific Railroad, 488 P.2d 738 (1971); English v. Southern Pac. 
Co. , 45 P.47 (1896). However, under Utah's current statutory 
scheme, the railroads no longer have a responsibility for designing 
railroad crossings and highway intersections or regulating the 
travel of motorists on roads and highways which pass over railroad 
tracks. Rather, the exclusive responsibility for designing 
railroad crossings and highway intersections and regulating the 
travel of motorists on roads and highways which pass over railroad 
tracks lies with the Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT"). 
Section 54-4-14 et, seq.6; Duncan supra. As stated in Duncan, 
6Section 54-4-15.1 (1992) specifically provides that 
(t)he Department of Transportation so as to 
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...(I)t is not, however, the responsibility of 
the railroad to place signs and devices on the 
public road. The railroad must maintain its 
own right of way, but it is not under any duty 
to place signs or devices on the public road. 
The design and maintenance of state roads 
and the control of traffic on state roads are 
UDOT's responsibilities and prerogatives. 
[Footnote omitted.] At common law, this 
responsibility at railroad crossings was 
shared with the railroad. [Footnote omitted.] 
Thus, in English,7 the railroad was found 
liable for failing to flag motorists on an 
intersecting city street, Since English, 
however, UDOT has been established, and the 
Legislature invested UDOT with ^power to 
determine and p r e s c r i b e the 
manner...of...protection of each crossing.' 
[Footnote omitted.] Although that 
responsibility in no way reduces the 
railroad's responsibility to maintain its 
right of way [footnote omitted], it would 
nevertheless, under ordinary circumstances, 
place the railroad in the role of meddler, 
trespasser, or usurper if the railroad were to 
put signs on the public road or forbid traffic 
on the public road from crossing its right of 
way. 
promote the public safety shall as prescribed 
in the act provide for the installing, 
maintaining, reconstructing, and improving of 
automatic and other safety appliances, signals 
or devices at grade crossings on public 
highways or roads over the tracks of any 
railroad or street railroad corporation in the 
state. 
Section 54-4-15(2) (1993) also provides that UDOT has the power to 
determine and prescribe the manner of protection of railroad 
crossings. 
7English v. Southern Pac. Co., 4 5 P.4 7 (18 96). 
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790 P.2d at 599-60. 
Thus, under Utah law, even at a railroad crossing that is 
more than ordinarily hazardous, railroads have no legal duty to 
change or upgrade the design or configuration of the crossing 
intersection of the warning devices.8 
Plaintiffs contend that notwithstanding the Utah statutory 
scheme, the railroad defendants had a joint responsibility with 
UDOT to install flashing lights and gates at the crossing, relying 
on CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (1993), 
which had before it a case out of Georgia in which prevailing state 
law continued to recognize, as do many states, the common law duty 
historically imposed on railroads. Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 665 
n.5. However, the issue in Easterwood was federal preemption of 
that common law duty, an issue not raised in the instant case. 
Easterwood did not address the question, which is present in this 
case, as to whether, in the context of a state statutory scheme 
which vests exclusive responsibility for crossing design with state 
government, a railroad nevertheless continues to have a historical 
common law shared duty, thus undermining the state statutory 
scheme. Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that federal law has 
8In addition, because Amtrak was merely operating its train 
over the track and did not own it, for this additional reason 
Amtrak has no legal duty to change or upgrade the railroad 
intersection or warning devices at the intersection. 
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preempted this statutory scheme. Thus, in Utah, the entity solely 
responsible for railroad crossing design is UDOT. Accordingly, as 
a matter of law the railroad defendants had no duty to provide or 
promote the installation of active warning devices at the subject 
railroad crossing. 
What, then, is the duty of railroads at ultra-hazardous 
crossings? Where a crossing is more than ordinarily dangerous, as 
the railroad defendants concede for the purpose of this motion, a 
railroad is liable for those conditions over which it has ownership 
or control. Duncan v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 790 P.2d 595, 598 
(Utah App. 1990), aff'd., 842 P.2d 832 (Utah 1992).9 Thus, trees, 
bushes, dirt mounds, other railroad cars, structures and other 
similar obstructions to view or sound caused or created by the 
railroad or allowed by the railroad on railroad right of way or 
property is its responsibility to abate. Jd. Thus, the railroad 
defendants have a duty to abate dangerous conditions it has created 
or allowed on the railroad right of way or property. In this case, 
there is neither a claim nor evidence to support a claim that the 
railroads created or allowed a dangerous condition on the railroad 
9In Duncan, the plaintiffs sought damages for negligence 
against the railroad by asserting that the warning devices 
employed at a particular cross were inadequate. Summary judgment 
for the railroad was granted by the trial court and affirmed by 
the Court of Appeals. 790 P.2d 595 (Utah App. 1990). The Utah 
Supreme Court also affirmed. 842 P.2d at 832. 
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right of way. Or its property. Thus, the railroad defendants are 
entitled to summary judgment on this issue as a matter of law. 
C. Amtrak's Duty to Give "Adequate Audible Warning" 
of the Train's Approach 
Plaintiffs claim that Amtrak failed to give "adequate audible 
warning" prior to the collision.10 Specifically, plaintiffs claim 
that Amtrak was negligent by failing to blow an emergency whistle 
pattern when the train crew had reason to believe that a collision 
might occur.11 
The difficulty with plaintiffs' claim on this point is, first, 
that in this case, there is no evidence that the train was 
incapable of being seen, particularly when it was as close to 
decedents' automobile as it was when the automobile was stopped at 
the stop sign. Further, plaintiffs have failed to cite to 
authority for their claim that because the crossing was more than 
ordinarily dangerous the train crew was obligated to sound its 
emergency whistle pattern. Finally, plaintiffs' argument overlooks 
the fact that train horns and signaling are governed by federal law 
and, thus, plaintiffs' claims that the horn should have been blown 
10This claim is not made against Southern Pacific because 
its train was not involved in the collision. 
11There is no dispute that several witnesses actually heard 
the train's horn prior to the collision and that the train's data 
event recorder established that the train had sounded its horn at 
different intervals along the track. 
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in a different pattern are preempted. 49 U.S.C. Sections 20153 and 
20702; 49 C.F.R. Section 229.129 (1995). United Transportation 
Union v. Foster, F.Supp. 1998 U. S. Dist .Lexis 14576 
(E.D.La.); see also First Security Bank v. Union Pacific R.R., 152 
F.3d 877,880 (8th Cir. 1998). 
D. Amtrak failed to brake in a timely manner. 
Plaintiffs claim that Amtrak failed to brake in a timely 
manner. Amtrak has moved for summary judgment on this claim on the 
ground there was no duty on its part for the engineer to apply the 
train's brakes until Brent Larrabee, after stopping the car in 
front of the tracks, proceeded onto the tracks, at which time it 
was too late for the train to avoid a collision. 
In Utah, an engineer operating a train may assume, and act in 
reliance on the assumption, that a person on or approaching a 
railroad crossing is in possession of his natural faculties and 
aware of the situation, including the fact that a train is a large 
and cumbersome instrumentality and is difficult to stop, and will 
exercise ordinary care and take reasonable precautions for the 
driver's own safety. Lawrence v. Bamberger R.R., 282 P.2d 335, 338 
(1955) . The duty to take reasonable efforts to stop a train arises 
only when the engineer knows or should know that a person's life or 
property is in danger and that the person does not intend or is 
unable to meet the duty to avoid the train. Id. Train crews are 
m one. 
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not obligated to speculate as to what a motorist will or will not 
do. Indeed, because of dangers to railroad passengers and 
increased risks of derailments associated with unexpected braking, 
trains are not obligated to slow or brake merely because a person 
is observed on or near the track. Power v. Union Pacific Railroad 
Co. , 655 F.2d 1380, 1384 (9th Cir. 1981). 
Applying the legal standard to the undisputed facts of this 
case, Amtrak is entitled to summary' judgment as a matter of law on 
this issue. The undisputed evidence is that the Tempo, which was 
driven by Brent Larrabee, came to a complete stop before the 
railroad crossing with the train only 50 to 300 feet from the 
crossing, traveling at a speed of 68 miles per hour., which is 
approximately 100 feet per second. The track to the south from 
where the train was coming was straight for over one-half mile 
away. The track was elevated. The train was very large. It 
sounded its horn. The warning signs were in place and visible the 
night of the collision. 
Because the Tempo had stopped, there was no basis for the 
train to justify applying its emergency brakes, and it was only 
when the Tempo started across the track that the engineer knew or 
should have known that Brent Larrabee might illegally enter onto 
r\ -« r\ t+1 ~* 
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the crossing in front of the train.12 Indeed, after applying its 
emergency brake, the train traveled approximately a third of a mile 
before coming to a stop. 
Based upon the foregoing, Amtrak had no duty to slow or apply 
its emergency brake until the Tempo drove onto the track, at which 
time it was too late for the collision to be avoided. Accordingly, 
on this issue, Amtrak is entitled to summary judgment. 
E. Southern Pacific's Duty to Alter the 
Design of the Intersection 
Plaintiffs claim that Southern Pacific designed and 
constructed the crossing in a way that created an illusion that 
vehicular movement could be performed safely and that obscured the 
visibility of approaching trains to motorists approaching the 
crossing. Southern Pacific has moved for summary judgment on this 
issue on the ground that there is no evidence that Southern Pacific 
designed the subject intersection, that Southern Pacific's right of 
way and track were in good operating condition and that no 
obstructions existed on its right of way. 
Plaintiffs argue that the Amtrak crew was concerned, 
because it was New Year's Eve, about whether the motorists in the 
three cars were aware of the approaching train as the vehicles 
crossed 10600 South and were being driven toward the 10200 South 
crossing. However, notwithstanding this concern, which 
constituted nothing more than speculation, there is no evidence 
that the crew knew or should have known that any of the motorists 
were unaware of the train. The mere fact that the motorists were 
in the vicinity of the train is insufficient to raise a duty to 
slow or brake. Lawrence v. Bamberger R.R., supra, 282 P.2d 335. 
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In this case plaintiffs have not come forward with any 
evidence that Southern Pacific was involved in the designing or 
constructing of the subject crossing. Moreover, there is no 
specific claim that Southern Pacific failed to maintain anything 
about its "right of way" or track.13 
Plaintiffs allege that the crossing was not properly 
maintained.14 More specifically, plaintiffs claim the crossing is 
defective in the angle at which the"public road and railroad track 
cross and that the crossing is somewhat obscured by visual clutter 
of background lights from nearby Interstate 1-15. 
However, this claim is without merit because under Utah law, 
a railroad cannot be held liable merely because a public road and 
railroad track intersect. Duncan v. Union Pac. R.R,, 842 P.2d 832, 
833 (Utah 1992). Further, there is no duty to eliminate railroad 
crossings. JEci. Implicit under this reasoning is that there is 
also no duty to re-design public crossings to alter the angles in 
which roads and railroad tracks intersect. 
Based upon the foregoing, Southern Pacific is entitled to 
summary judgment, and its motion for summary judgment is hereby 
1JPlaintiffs have demonstrated nothing about Southern 
Pacific's "right of way" which constituted a greater hazard than 
that which existed because it constituted an intersection. 
14This claim is not made against Amtrak because Amtrak did 
not own the railroad track. 
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granted. 
South Jordan's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Plaintiffs claim that the City of South Jordan is liable 
because it was negligent in failing to install or maintain advance 
warning signs, painted pavement markings, flashing lights and 
crossing gates at the subject crossing, that it maintained improper 
signs at the crossing, that it failed to properly design, construct 
and maintain the crossing, or, in the alternative, that it should 
have closed the crossing. 
In its motion for summary judgment, South Jordan argued 
summary judgment was appropriate because (1) the notice of claim 
filed by -plaintiffs was not provided to the appropriate 
individuals: namely, the city council and the city mayor or city 
manager; (2) South Jordan owed no duty to plaintiffs; and (3) South 
Jordan is immune from suit under the Governmental Immunity Act, 
Section 63-30-1 ejt seq., (1953), as amended. 
Addressing first the notice of claim filed by the plaintiffs, 
pursuant to Section 63-30-13 U.C.A. (1954): 
A claim against a political subdivision, or 
against its employee for an act or omission 
occurring during the performance of the. 
employee's duties, within the scope of 
employment, or under color of authority, is 
barred unless notice of claim is filed with 
the governing body of the political 
subdivision according to the requirements of 
Section 63-30-11 within one year after the 
claim arises.... 
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It is undisputed plaintiffs sent a notice of claim by 
certified mail to the "City of South Jordan and South Jordan City 
Council," within the one-year time frame and that the contents of 
the notice satisfied the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 
U.C.A. (1998). What South Jordan argues is that plaintiffs were 
required to serve the "governing body" and in this case that would 
be the city council and either the "mayor and/or the city manager. 
In opposing this argument of defendants, plaintiffs note the 
term "governing body," for a city of the third class, such as South 
Jordan, is defined in Section 10-1-104(3) U.C.A. (1997) as the city 
council. Furthermore, plaintiffs point out that Section 10-3-105 
U.C.A. (1997) states that 
[t]he governing body of cities of the third 
class shall be a council composed of six 
members, one of whom shall be the mayor and 
the remaining five shall be council members. 
Accordingly, it is plaintiffs' position that in serving the 
South Jordan City Council it fully complied with the mandates of 
Section 63-30-13. With this the Court agrees. 
Turning next to the issue of whether South Jordan had any duty 
to the decedents, it should be noted that pursuant to Fishbauah v. 
Utah Power & Light, 353 UAR 20 (1998), South Jordan has a duty to 
maintain its roads in a reasonably safe condition and to exercise 
reasonable care to warn travelers of potentially unsafe locations, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
PRICE v. NATIONAL RAILROAD Page 25 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
such as railroad crossings. There is, however, no duty to erect 
any particular traffic control device. Jones v. Bountiful City, 
834 P.2d 556 (Utah App. 1992). Indeed, all that is required is 
that once the municipality takes action install such devices, it 
must do so in a non-negligent manner and maintain the traffic 
control devices in a reasonably safe and visible condition. Id. 
In the instant case, although plaintiffs claim the paint 
markings at the crossing were faded and not legible and that the 
stop sign was not properly maintained, it is undisputed the signs 
accomplished their job. Each of the surviving drivers and 
passengers testified that they knew they were at a railroad 
crossing. Indeed, even Brent Larrabee brought the Tempo to a 
complete stop prior to entering upon the tracks. 
Moreover, at the time the Tempo was stopped in front of the 
crossing, the train was only 50 to 300 feet from the crossing and 
capable of being observed on the track. Passengers in the third 
vehicle saw the train and watched it for some time. Their view, 
which was even behind the Tempo, was so unobstructed that they saw 
the first car drive over the track, at which point the train was 
close enough to illuminate the side of the car with its headlight. 
In sum, the purpose of the warning devices at the crossing was 
to warn motorists and others of the existence of the railroad 
crossing (not the approach of a train) , at which point the 
r\ A O O O 
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motorists then had the duty to stop, look and listen for an 
oncoming train. The warning devices were sufficient to accomplish 
this objective, and it is therefore clear that South Jordan 
complied with its duty to provide an adequate warning system. 
Indeed, the undisputed evidence indicates that Brent Larrabee 
responded by stopping as a result of such devices. 
Plaintiffs contend that UDOT had approved the crossing for the 
installation of an active warning system and that, therefore, South 
Jordan had a duty to upgrade the crossing. However, this argument 
overlooks the fact that the project was never funded. Further, 
South Jordan had no authority to order UDOT to supply the money, 
see Duncan, 842 P. 2d at 834, nor did UDOT have the power to require 
South Jordan to provide the requisite funds. 
Based upon the foregoing, South Jordan is entitled to summary 
judgment. 
Because South Jordan had no duty to upgrade the crossing and 
because it adequately warned decedents of the existence of the 
crossing, the Court does not reach the issue of governmental 
immunity. 
Based upon the forgoing, South Jordan's Motion for Summary 
Judgment is granted. 
Pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, counsel for the railroad defendants shall prepare 
m OQQ 
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an order consistent with this Memorandum Decision. 
DATED this 4th day of May, 1999. 
BY THE COURT 
ANNE M. STIRBA >,. 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
i^§0A 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
DANIEL D. PRICE, SUSANNE Q. PRICE, 
KENT SWENSEN, KAY SWENSEN, 
ROSS LARRABEE and CARMA 
LARRABEE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER 
CORPORATION AND SOUTHERN 
PACIFIC TRANSPORTATION COMPANY 
and CITY OF SOUTH JORDAN, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND TO 
STRIKE AFFIDAVITS 
SUBMITTED BY PLAINTIFFS 
Case No. 970903387WD 
Honorable Anne M. Stirba 
Defendants' motions for summary judgment and motions to strike the affidavits 
submitted by plaintiffs in opposition to defendants' motions for summary judgment 
came before the Court for hearing on February 25, 1999. Plaintiffs were represented 
by Robert A. Schuetze and David J. Jordan. Defendants National Railroad Passenger 
Corporation and Southern Pacific Transportation Company were represented by Casey 
K. McGarvey, and defendant City of South Jordan was represented by Allan L. Larson. 
Having considered oral arguments and all memoranda and evidence submitted by the 
parties on these motions, including memoranda pertaining to plaintiffs' supplement to 
oral argument filed after the February 25th hearing, and having entered its 
Memorandum Decision of May 4, 1999, and for good cause shown, 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants' motions to strike are granted. The 
following affidavits are hereby stricken. 
1. Archie Burnham, Jr. P.E., in total. 
2. Randy S. Hunter, paragraphs 6-8. 
3. Orlando Jerez, paragraphs 6-8. 
4. J. Clark Clendenen, in total. 
5. Paul F. Byrnes, paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants' motions for summary judgment are 
granted, and that judgment be entered in favor of defendants and against plaintiffs, no 
cause of action, with prejudice and on the merits. 
•ih 
DATED this £% "day of May. 1999. 
BY THE COURT: 
ANNE M. STIRBA 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Robert S. Schuetze 
David J. Jordan 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
-2- 01308 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
'£&! ' ^ J ^ V V X A ^ 
Casey K., McGarvey 
Attorneys for Defendants 
National Railroad Passenger Corporation and 
Southern Pacific Transportation Company 
(U&^ 
Allan L. Q 
Attorney for Defendant 
City of South Jordan 
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ALLAN L. LARSON (A1896) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant City of South Jordan 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000 
Telephone: (801)521-9000 
* -
FRED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
SALT Itae COUNTY 
Deputy Clwfc 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DANIEL D. PRICE, SUSANNE Q. 
PRICE, KENT SWENSEN, KAY 
SWENSEN, ROSS LARRABEE and 
CARMA LARRABEE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER 
CORPORATION, SOUTHERN PACIFIC 
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, and 
CITY OF SOUTH JORDAN, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL 
OF CITY OF SOUTH JORDAN 
Civil No. 970903387WD 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
The City of South Jordan's Motion for Summary Judgment and to Strike Affidavit came 
on regularly for hearing on February 25, 1999. The plaintiffs were represented by Robert A. 
Schuetze and David J. Jordan, the defendants National Railroad Passenger Corporation and 
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Southern Pacific were represented by Casey K. McGarvey, and the defendant City of South Jordan 
was represented by Allan L. Larson. Having considered oral arguments and all memoranda and 
evidence submitted by the parties, and the Court having previously entered its Memorandum 
Decision and Order granting the City of South Jordan's Motion for Summary Judgment, and for 
good cause appearing, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
L Plaintiffs' claims as against the defendant City of South Jordan are hereby dismissed 
with prejudice and upon the merits, and plaintiffs' Complaints and Amended Complaints as 
against the City of South Jordan are hereby dismissed with prejudice; and 
2. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of the defendant City of South Jordan and 
against the plaintiffs and each of them, no cause of action, each of the parties to bear their own 
costs incurred. 
DATED this day of May, 1999. 
BY THE COURT: 
-77 
Anne M. Stirba, District Court Judge ,T=. . 
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APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
DATED this XT day of May, 1999. 
CORTEZ MACAULAY BERNHARDT & SCHUETZE, LLC 
By
" >„ 
' Robert A. Schuetze 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
DATED this f/Ct day oO&ay, 1999. 
STOEL RIVES 
David J. Jordan 
Mark E. Hindley 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
DATED this 2Q day of May, 1999. 
BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC & SAVAGE 
By-
Casey K. McGarvey 
Attorneys for Railroad Defendants 
DATED this of May, 1999. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By. ^/LA^S.A— — 
Allan L/Tarson 
Attorneys for Defendant City of South Jordan 
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APPROVED AS TO FORM; 
DATED this 2£ day of May, 1999. 
CORTEZ MACAULAY BERNHARDT <fc SCHUETZE, LLC 
• ^ ibert A. Scbuetze 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
DATED this day of May, 1999. 
STOEL RIVES 
By-
David J. Jordan 
Mark E. Hindley 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
DATED t h i s ^ M . day of May, 1999. 
BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC & SAVAGE 
Rv O&9J/I, £ V>J 
Casey iC. McGarvcy 
Attorneys for Railroad Defendants 
DATED this day of May, 1999. 
SNOW. CHRISTENSEN & MARTtNEAU 
B y ^ 
Allan L. Larson 
Attorneys for Defendant City of Souxh Jordan 
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APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
DATED this 2 ^ d a v of May, 1999. 
CORTE^ACAULAY BERNHARDT ft SCHUETZE, LLC 
fly-
Ruben A. Schuctze 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
DATED this day of May, 1999. 
STOELRIVES 
By-
David J. Jordan 
MarkE-Hindley 
Aitoraeys for Plaintiff 
DATED this day of May, 1999. 
HERMAN, GAUHN, TOMSIC ft SAVAGE 
' / C a s e y K.McGarvey 
Anameys for Railroad Defendams 
DATED this day of May, 1999. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN ft MARTINEAU 
By. 
Allan L. Larson 
Anoroeys for Defendant Ciry of South Jordan 
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APPROVED AS TO PQW* 
DATED tins day <rf May. 19B9. 
CaRT^rtjACAULAY BERNHARDT ft SCHDEIZE. LLC 
By 
Rohen A. SamttB 
Asanas fi* PfcUanff 
D A I E D iris _ \ _dayofM<yv IS"*. 
STDEL RIVES 
By. 
.Jordtt !) D*vidJ. 
ABOcwys ftr Flaionff 
KERMAN. GAUFW. TQMSC & SAVAGE 
By. Casey J£-McG«rvcy 
Axxorays 
DATED this day of May* 1599. 
SNOW, CHBIST£N5£N & MARTWEAU 
By.— 
£S.«-—o*-**1— 
* 
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•WSRSP 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE C™ ,K'™ 
STATE OF UTAH W i ' ^ t COUNTY 
DANIEL D. PRICE, SUSANNE Q. PRICE, 
KENT SWENSEN, KAY SWENSEN, 
ROSS LARRABEE and CARMA 
LARRABEE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER 
CORPORATION AND SOUTHERN 
PACIFIC TRANSPORTATION COMPANY 
and CITY OF SOUTH JORDAN, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL 
Case No. 970903387WD 
Honorable Anne M. Stirba 
Plaintiffs in this action were represented by David J. Jordan of Stoel Rives LLP 
and Robert A. Schuetze of Cortez Macaulay Bernhardt & Schuetze LLC. Defendants 
National Railroad Passenger Corporation and Southern Pacific Transportation 
Company were represented by Casey K. McGarvey of Berman, Gaufin, Tomsic, 
Savage & Campbell. Defendant City of South Jordan was represented by Allan L. 
Larson of Snow, Christensen & Martineau. Having entered its Memorandum Decision 
and Order granting defendants' motions for summary judgment, and good cause 
appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs' claims against defendants, National Railroad Passenger 
Corporation, Southern Pacific Transportation Company and City of South Jordan, are 
-1-
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hereby dismissed with prejudice and on the merits. 
2. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of defendants, National Railroad 
Passenger Corporation, Southern Pacific Transportation Company and City of South 
Jordan, and against plaintiffs, Daniel D. Price, Susanne Q. Price, Kent Swensen, Kay 
Swensen, Ross Larrabee and Carma Larrabee, no cause of action, andjdefendants are 
cmMs*€\tiA fe>4«UM C U M * \r+Kco±kr
 # 
awarded their costs incurred in this action as allowed by low Qncrto bo inoortorl intn tbis prtt^y/ 
judgment hQwaftpr in arrnrdanpe yyith Rule 54 of the I Itflh Ri lies of Civil Pj&e&k&e. in 
4fre-bjank3 providMiorJ^o^ — — 
' 1 NationaTR§rttr©ad^assenger Corporation $ 
Southern Pacific Transportation Q 
City of South Jordan 
3. Each party shall bear their own attorney's fees. 
DATED this H ^ day of fetay, 1999. 
BY THE COURT: 
AfJNE M. i N  . STIRBA 
District Court Judge 
JUDGMENT DEBTORS1 ADDRESSES: 
Daniel D. Price 
Susanne Q. Price 
11113 S. Prescott Drive 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
-2-
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Kent Swensen 
Kay Swensen 
1470 Pimilco Place 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
Ross Larrabee 
Carma Larrabee 
1565 East 11245 South 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Robert S. Schuetze 
David J. Jordan 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Casey K.WlcGarvey | 
Attorneys for Defendants 
National Railroad Passenger Corporation and 
Southern Pacific Transportation Company 
Allan LLarson 
Attorney for Defendant 
City of South Jordan 
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